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Abstract
A global deluge of debit cards and prepaid cards – payment cards that do not
require consumers to qualify for credit – is rapidly making electronic payment systems
accessible to much of the world’s population that previously paid in cash for goods and
services. The global proliferation of payment cards is fraught with both risk and promise
for consumers.
The billions of people of low to moderate incomes who are being hurled from a
cash economy into the era of electronic payments in emerging economies by the
proliferation of debit and prepaid cards are particularly vulnerable to abuses by banks and
merchants. Unregulated private lawmaking by payment card associations and card
issuers will not ensure that consumers are treated fairly, due to their countervailing
incentives to attract merchants into their payment networks. Technological solutions
promote efficiency and limit abuse, but cannot ensure fair resolution of consumermerchant disputes. Payment card associations such as Visa and MasterCard operate
chargeback systems for resolving disputes, but chargeback systems cannot function in
cash economies without merchants’ consent, because cash transactions are usually
anonymous, evidenced at most by a receipt, and do not involve an intermediary.
However, while the lack of anonymity inherent in the use of payment cards entails
risk for consumer privacy, it also makes possible greater transparency in payment
systems. As billions of vulnerable consumers become connected to electronic payment
systems, chargeback systems become a possible means of protecting them from merchant
misconduct. Moreover, this lack of anonymity makes possible new ways of protecting
consumers, such as disclosure to consumers of outcomes of the Visa and MasterCard
chargeback systems through merchant ratings such as those posted on eBay.
There is a risk that nations with emerging economies will uncritically emulate
regimes of consumer protection adopted in the United States and Europe. These regimes
in many respects lack a consistent conceptual foundation and fail to address problems,
such as bank fees, access to banking services and payment system insolvency, that are
poorly addressed in developed countries if they are addressed at all. For example, debit
and prepaid card transactions are both a convenient means of obtaining cash and a
substitute for cash, but this does not justify denying chargeback rights to consumers who
use debit and prepaid cards, as if they had paid in cash.
Prior scholarship on payment cards has suffered from the assumption that
American use of credit cards is normative. This article demonstrates that it is a global
anomaly; most consumers worldwide use payment cards for convenience rather than a
source of long-term credit, and that is why debit cards have become popular so quickly.
Moreover, fees and charges imposed on consumers for payment card services are one of
the most prolific sources of consumer complaints. Fee regulation should be regarded as a
legitimate part of payments law in scholarship on the subject, and should not be ignored
in establishing a regulatory system to govern debit and prepaid cards.
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I. Introduction
Debit cards, sometimes issued as “ATM cards,” “check cards,” “cash cards,” and
“Smart Cards” or “chip cards,”1 are proliferating worldwide at a staggering rate.2 Debit
cards are distinguished from credit cards and charge cards in that the use of a debit card
results in a direct debit to the user’s bank account, while the use of a credit card or charge
card3 results in an extension of credit to the cardholder.
Although the volume of credit card transactions also has grown,4 in 2003 debit
cards overtook credit cards in aggregate dollar volume worldwide in Visa, by far the
largest of the payment card networks representing about half of the global payment card
market.5 Debit cards are now the dominant card-based payment system everywhere
except the United States, Canada and Japan, and the most widely used non-cash
consumer payment system in the world. Even in the United States, debit card
transactions have risen precipitously, and now represent a higher percentage of Visa
point-of-sale (“POS”) transactions than credit cards.6
In China alone, according to the People’s Bank of China over 663 million debit
cards, the overwhelming majority of them issued by domestic banks, were active in
2004;7 as of 1995, the number stood at 5 million.8
Moreover, in a massive change that has accelerated during the past 3-5 years,
instead of cash, millions of employees from Russia to Mexico are now paid through
prepaid cards called “payroll cards,” which they can swipe at a store to make a purchase
and have the price debited from an account funded by wages deposited by their employer.
Prepaid cards include phone cards, gift cards, payroll cards,9 benefit cards, and
travel cards, among others. Prepaid cards are increasingly used to pay public benefits,
especially in the many countries in which checks are rarely used as a method of payment.
Prepaid cards may be prepaid debit cards, the use of which results in a debit to a bank
account opened for the benefit of the cardholder, e.g., by an employer, or they may be
1

“Smart Cards,” also called “chip cards,” are multifunction cards that include a microchip. They can
function as debit cards or credit cards, or perform other data functions. See Section II.B, infra.
2
See infra, Section III. See also Ronald J. Mann, “Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information
Age,” 93 Geo. L.J. 633, 653 (2005) (“Mann”) (describing the rise of debit cards in the U.S. to prominence
since the late 1990’s).
3
Charge cards, such as Diners Club and most American Express cards, differ from credit cards in that
unpaid balances cannot be rolled over at the end of a billing cycle and must be paid in full each time.
4
BIS Retail Payments Study, Charts 3-5; Table 1, infra.
5
“[G]lobal Visa debit card volume reached US$1.48 trillion at the end of 2003, an increase of 17 percent
over the previous year. At the same time global Visa credit volume increased five percent from the
previous year to US$1.45 trillion.” Available at http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press217.jsp.
6
Jonathan Zinman, “Why Use Debit Instead of Credit? Consumer Choice in a Trillion Dollar Market,”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, July 15, 2004, at 2, available at
www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/zinman/2842_debit_or_credit.pdf.
7
Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire, February 16, 2005. In contrast, only one million of China’s 1.3
billion people have credit cards. Asia Pulse, January 6, 2004, available on Westlaw Database WNS-FI.
8
See Ted Griffith, “MBNA Sets Sights on China,” (May 23, 2004), www.delawareonline.com (also
pointing out that most people have to make bank deposits and withdrawals in person, apparently due to the
lack of ATM’s).
9
See Budnitz, supra, at 6-7; Christoslav E. Anguelov, Marianne A. Hilgert, and Jeanne M. Hogarth, “U.S.
Consumers and Electronic Banking, 1995-2003,” p. 5, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Winter 2004, Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/winter04_ca.pdf.
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“stored value cards” in which value is stored on the card itself.10 While some prepaid
cards, so-called “closed loop” cards including most gift and phone cards, are usable only
for purchases from a particular retailer or service provider, increasingly prepaid cards are
network-branded “open loop” cards, transactions with which are processed through the
Visa, MasterCard, and other payment card networks.11
Because prepaid cards do not require either creditworthiness or a bank account,
they are proliferating especially in areas such as Africa and parts of Latin America where
relatively few people have bank accounts.12 However, even in the United States, prepaid
phone cards have become popular and payroll cards are catching on as a way to pay
wages to the many, usually low-income employees who lack a bank account, sometimes
referred to as “the unbanked.”13
Several factors have contributed to the rise of the debit card and the prepaid card.
As further discussed in this article, most developing countries never acquired the credit
card habit; they lack the credit information and reporting systems necessary to support
credit cards, and relatively few of their citizens have sufficient demonstrable income to
qualify for credit. While computer use and e-commerce are growing in the developing
countries, they remain the domain of a small percentage of those populations. As a
result, as the “Plastic Revolution” takes hold in developing countries like China, Brazil
and Mexico, it is not credit cards but debit and prepaid cards that are beginning to
transform the cash economies in places like China, Brazil and southern Africa.
The trend toward debit and prepaid card use is part of what some economists have
erroneously called a trend toward “cashlessness.”14 However, debit cards and many
prepaid cards are not only a substitute for cash, but also a convenient means of obtaining
10

See generally, Mark E. Budnitz, “Payment Systems Update 2005: Substitute Checks, Remotely Created
Items, Payroll Cards, and Other New-Fangled Products,” 59 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 3, 6-7 (Spr.-Sum.
2005) (“Budnitz”); “Prepaid Cards in Europe 2004,” DataMonitor March 5, 2004, available at
http://datamonitor.com/~ec641c4fc0a346018e7b491430411c27~/industries/research/?pid=BFFS0243&type
=Brief.; Julia S. Cheney, “Prepaid Card Models: a Study in Diversity,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, March, 2005, available at http://www.paymentsnews.com/2005/03/philadelphia_fe.html;
Mark Furletti and Stephen Smith, “The Laws, Regulations, and Industry Practices That Protect Consumers
Who Use Electronic Payment Systems: ACH E-checks and Prepaid Cards,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, March, 2005, available at http://www.paymentsnews.com/2005/03/philadelphia_fe.html; Beth
S. DeSimone & Carrie A. O’Brien, “Payroll Cards: Would you like your pay with those fries?” 9 N.C.
Banking Inst. 35 (2005).
11
Prepaid cards may also be divided into “online” and “offline” cards. The latter are stored value cards
such as copy cards used in copy machines which carry value stored internally on the card. The former are
cards that electronically access value stored in an account maintained on a database at a bank, payroll
processor, retailer, or other external location. In the U.S., stored value cards are not currently covered by
Federal Reserve Regulation E. The Federal Reserve has proposed to extend Regulation E coverage to
payroll cards, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has proposed extending deposit insurance to
cover funds accessed with certain payroll cards. See Budnitz, supra, at 6.
12
See infra, Sections III.C, D and E.
13
Budnitz, supra, at 6-7; “Card Usage Climbs: New survey shows prepaid card usage doubled in the last
two years,” InteleCard News, 1/1/02, available at
http://www.intelecard.com/factsandfigures/03factsandfig.asp?A_ID=97.
14
See Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke, “Can Cash Hold Its Own? International Comparisons: Theory
and Evidence” (February 2002) (unpublished manuscript); Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke,
“Changing trends in payment systems for selected G10 and EU countries 1990-1998,” International
Correspondent Banking Review Yearbook 2000/2001, April 2001. The foregoing articles are available at
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scher/.
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it at an automated teller machine (ATM), and ATM’s, already ubiquitous in the
developed countries, are rapidly spreading through the developing world. Cash payments
still amount to an estimated 70-90% of retail payment volume15 though they are low in
value compared to card transactions. In recent years the growth in volume of debit card
transactions has outpaced that of credit cards, indicating that payment cards – even credit
cards - are primarily used as a cheap means of funds transfer rather than for credit
purposes.16 Rather than curtail the use of cash, the spread of debit cards has revitalized
cash economies by makingcash more readily available.17
Debit cards and “open loop” prepaid cards can be used either at ATM’s or at the
point of sale (POS).18 Other ways by which consumers access and transfer funds
electronically include automated clearing house (“ACH”) payments; home banking;
electronic giros (“e-giro”) in Europe and parts of Asia; and Internet-based “electronic
cash.” However, none of these other methods has approached debit cards in the number
or volume of transactions, nor in worldwide growth.19
Credit card use is not growing nearly as rapidly as debit card use.20 Globally, the
ability to finance a purchase and carry a balance on a credit card seems to hold limited
appeal, because most consumers use payment cards – even credit cards - for convenience,
as a cash substitute or a way to obtain cash, not as a loan. Available data show that card
use in retail payments has grown primarily at the expense of cash.21 This is even true in
the United States, where of the personal consumption on goods and services in 1996,
57% were made by checks, 21% with cash and 22% with payment cards. In contrast, in
1984, only 6% of personal consumption spending in the United States was made with
cards, compared with 58% with checks and 36% with cash.22 While American
consumers persist in the habit of maintaining large credit card balances and resist the use
of debit cards for purchases, they remain an anomaly compared to consumers in most
other countries.23
The stakes involved in the proliferation of debit and prepaid cards may be much
15

Markose and Loke, “Can Cash Hold Its Own? International Comparisons: Theory and Evidence,” supra,
at 4 (“despite the significant trend towards non-cash retail payments, it is estimated that 70%-90% of the
volume of retail transactions remain cash financed”). However, Mann cites data from a November 2003
Nilson report indicating that in the U.S. as of 2002 only 42% of retail payment transactions were cashfinanced.
16
Ibid.; see also Mann, supra, at 656-658.
17
Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, “Retail Payments in
Selected Countries: a Comparative Study,” September, 1999 (“BIS Retail Payments Study”), at 12.
18
For a description of various uses of payment cards by consumers and the structure of payment card
networks with diagrams, see Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers (Newark: Matthew
Bender & Co., 2003), ¶6.02.
19
See BIS Retail Payments Study, supra, at 14 and Charts 3-5.
20
See Table 1, infra.
21
See Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke, “Can Cash Hold Its Own? International Comparisons: Theory
and Evidence” (February 2002) (unpublished manuscript); Sheri M. Markose and Yiing Jia Loke,
“Changing trends in payment systems for selected G10 and EU countries 1990-1998,” International
Correspondent Banking Review Yearbook 2000/2001, April 2001. These articles are available at
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scher/
22
David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: the Digital Revolution in Buying and
Borrowing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000) (1st ed.), at 91. See also Mann, supra, at 656.
23
See BIS Retail Payments Study, supra, Chart 9, and Ronald Mann, “Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the
United States and Japan,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1055 (May 2002). Also, see infra, Section IV.A.
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greater than the fees generated by payment card transactions. While the deluge of debit
and prepaid cards in emerging economies is linking much of the world’s population, and
many of its retail businesses, to payment card networks for the first time, mobile
telephones are linking many of the same people to the telecommunications network.24
Mobile banking,25 in particular, promises to draw many of the as-yet-unbanked into the
payments marketplace.26 Two recent studies suggest that these related phenomena each
will generate an economic “growth dividend” in the developing world.27 Mobile
telephone service providers may also emerge as serious competition for banks and money
remitters, based on prepaid phone cards. Moreover, technology is emerging in the
economically developed world for the use of mobile phones to make payments at
checkout counters; mobile payments may become a common method to circumvent the
cash register.
This article will explore the implications for consumer protection policy of the
global proliferation of debit and prepaid cards and the regional differences in payment
habits that affect the pace and distribution of that proliferation. Despite the explosive
growth in debit and prepaid cards, and to a lesser extent, in credit cards, few countries
outside North America and the E.U. have enacted consumer protection laws regulating
the rights of card users with respect to card issuers or merchants.28 Within North
America and the E.U., issues such as the reversibility of consumer transactions and the
allocation of losses caused by unauthorized transactions are resolved in ways that are
inconsistent and analytically unsatisfactory, and unduly influenced by legal regimes
24

Mobile phone penetration of the consumer market already surpasses, in most countries, the percentage of
consumers who have checking accounts. In Africa, 6.1% of the population had a mobile phone as of the
end of 2003, and they are often shared – a study in Tanzania revealed that as much as 28% of the
population had “access” to a mobile phone - while consumer checking accounts are rare in many African
countries. Mobile phone service in Africa is overwhelmingly paid for with prepaid cards. In Europe
overall, 55% of the population had a mobile phone, while the highest incidence of checking accounts in
Europe was about 40 percent in France. In Asia, 15% of the population had a mobile phone, and in most
Asian countries checking accounts are not typically used by consumers.
25
See, e.g., “China’s Exploding Wireless Industry,” mPulse Magazine (Hewlett Packard, Inc.), October
2001, www.cooltown.com/cooltown/mpulse/1001-china.asp (wireless stock trading from mobile phones
already common among 70 million Chinese who buy and sell stocks in China); “Calling Across the
Divide,” The Economist, March 12, 2005, at 74 (vendors in marketplace stalls in Zambia pay for inventory
using text messages on mobile phones).
26
Harry Leinonen, “Developments in Retail Payment Systems,” Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”)
Papers, No. 7 (Nov. 2001), at 63, Box 1.
27
See “Electronic Payments Worth R7bn – Visa,” http://business.iafrica.com/news/389484.htm
(November 10, 2004) (studies conducted by Global Insight and Econometrix indicating that a ten percent
increase in electronic payments as a share of private consumption expenditure would translate into an
increase of 0.6 percent in GDP); Leonard Waverman, Meloria Meschi and Melvyn Fuss, “The Impact of
Telecoms on Economic Growth in Developing Countries” (“Waverman”), in Africa: The Impact of Mobile
Phones (Vodafone Policy Paper Series, No. 2, March 2005), at 10-11, available at
www.vodafone.com/africa (study by scholars from London Business School, John Cabot University
(Rome), and University of Toronto, together with LECG Consultants, suggesting that an increase of ten
mobile phones per 100 people in a typical developing country expands GDP by 0.6 percent) See also
“Calling Across the Divide,” The Economist, March 12, 2005, at 74.
28
For a summary of existing laws, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”), Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Committee on Consumer Policy, “Report on
Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders,” June 14, 2002 (“OECD Report on Consumer Protections
for Payment Cardholders”).
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designed to regulate the use of different payment technologies twenty or thirty years
ago.29
While often cognizant of the inconsistencies in American payments law,
scholarship in payment systems frequently has been premised on the assumption that
American payments culture, and the American addiction to credit cards, is normative.
With over one billion consumers in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the former Soviet
bloc countries gaining access to electronic payment networks with debit and prepaid
cards, and few of them owning or using credit cards, this assumption is no longer
accurate, if it ever was.
At the same time, the resolution of issues of consumer protection policy in those
areas has become critical. Without legislation to regulate payment cards in developing
countries, the governments of those countries effectively cede consumer protection to
private lawmaking by card associations and banks. Part V of this article will discuss the
inadequacies of private lawmaking to protect debit and prepaid card users, the problems
of consumer protection that must be resolved in regulatory policy, and the lack of
satisfactory American solutions to solve the global problems of protecting consumers
newly introduced to electronic means of payment by the proliferation of debit and
prepaid cards.
II.

Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions
A. Transaction Structure

Debit card transactions may be processed through payment card networks such as
Visa and MasterCard, or they may be processed through interbank networks such as the
Star and Cirrus systems. The key parties to a debit card transaction are the cardholder
(usually a consumer),30 the merchant, the card issuer (a bank where the cardholder
maintains an account or has deposited funds), the “merchant acquirer” (the merchant’s
bank), the processor (in most cases) that processes the transaction for the merchant
acquirer, the payment card association (e.g., Visa and MasterCard) or interbank network
(e.g., Star and Cirrus in the United States) that provides facilities for clearing and settling
the transaction between banks. Debit card transactions resemble credit card transactions
in most respects, the major differences being the debit posted directly to the cardholder’s
bank account and the fee structure.
Debit card transactions are governed by a series of contracts. The underlying
contract between merchant and consumer gives rise to the payment obligation and
authorizes the merchant to draw funds from the consumer’s bank account to satisfy it.
The consumer-card issuer contract governs the obligation of the bank to honor an
authorized order to pay funds from the consumer’s account. The merchant-merchant
acquirer contract governs the rights of the merchant to be credited with funds by the
merchant acquirer once the merchant presentsthe transaction to the merchant acquirer ,
and the right of the merchant acquirer to deduct a fee, called a “discount.” The
merchant transfers its rights against the consumer to the merchantacquirer , which then
29

See generally Mann, supra.
See text at note 15, infra. Many countries do not draw a distinction between consumer and nonconsumer debit cardholders. The United States and certain EU countries do.

30
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transfers these rights to the card issuer in exchange for payment in accordance with
payment card association rules that contractually bind both banks as association
members. The card issuer then debits the consumer’s account for the authorized amount
in accordance with the payment order and its contract with the consumer.
The costs of processing payment card transactions generally are borne by
merchants through discount fees paid per transaction to their merchant acquirers. The
merchant acquirers are the merchant’s banks, members of Visa, MasterCard or another
card association, which either own – as in the case of Chase - or are part of a bank
association affiliated with, a processing entity, the largest of which in the U.S. is First
Data Corporation. These banks are called “merchant acquirers” because by contracting
with the merchant to accept payment through Visa or MasterCard they are said to have
“acquired” the merchant for the Visa or MasterCard association.31
Visa, the largest payment card network, is an association of banks governed by a
common set of bylaws and operating regulations. It is organized as the Visa International
association, comprised of six regional entities, the largest of which is Visa USA, Inc.32
Each regional entity is owned by member banks in the region. Worldwide, Visa has
about 21,000 member banks. Banks may join as card issuers, merchant acquirers or both;
however, the merchant acquirer business as a practical matter is concentrated in a few
large banks33 while many smaller banks join so they can issue payment cards with the
Visa logo. The regional entities provide member banks with clearing and settlement
facilities for payment card transactions within their region, and also with security
technology and procedures. The MasterCard association has a structure similar to Visa’s.
B. Types of Debit and Prepaid Cards
Debit cards are categorized as PIN (“personal identification number”)debit , also
called “online” debit, and signature debit, also called “offline.”34 Signature debit cards
are mainly issued in the United States by Visa and MasterCard member banks, bear the
Visa or MasterCard logo, and do not exist in most other countries, such as Canada where
all debit cards are PIN-based. A signature is required, as with a credit card. PIN debit
card transactions require entry of a PIN into a keypad, and normally clear through
interbank networks such as the Star and Cirrus systems.
Although most consumers do not know it, there are significant differences
between the two. PIN debit card transactions clear and are debited to the consumer’s
bank account almost instantaneously; they are real-time transactions. In the U.S., the
consumer often will be charged a fee by her bank for using another bank’s or a
merchant’s facilities to consummate the PIN debit transaction. Such fees are uncommon
in many other countries.
31

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., 396 F.3d 96, 101-102 (2nd Cir. 2005).
Other regional organizations include Visa Latin America, Visa Asia Pacific, Visa Europe, and a region
encompassing Africa and the Middle East.
33
In the U.S., a group of large banks affiliated with First Data Corp., the largest processor, has almost half
of the merchant acquirer market, while Chase, which has its own processor called Chase Merchant
Services, has about 13% of the market.
34
“Offline” is really a misnomer. Stored value cards and cash are true “offline” payment devices.
Signature debit transactions may be posted and cleared electronically, but they are not posted and cleared in
real time like PIN debit transactions.
32
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Signature debit transactions, like most checks, take two to three days to clear and
be posted to the consumer’s bank account. They are riskier for the merchant, which
could go unpaid if during those two to three days the consumer closes or depletes his
bank account. However, signature debit is favored by American banks, which receive
higher fees from merchants, paid in the form of discounts from what is credited to the
merchant’s account, than they do in PIN debit transactions. In contrast, merchants
benefit from PIN debit in the form of lower discounts, but American consumers have
resisted PIN debit due to the fees passed on to them by merchants and banks.
Many newer debit cards are actually “Smart cards.” Rather than a magnetic strip,
Smart cards contain a microchip. This makes them capable of storing a greater volume of
data and performing multiple functions. Smart cards can have both debit and credit
functions, of which the consumer can choose either at the point of sale. They can collect,
utilize and send data about purchases, benefit entitlements, and other information.
For the card issuer, Smart Cards represent an additional source of information
about the consumer, and a possible source of additional revenue through the use or sale of
that information. For the consumer, there is a risk of loss of privacy in the collection of
this information. This capacity is not new; the ability to collect information about the
consumer proved to be a selling point when Visa and MasterCard were building their
bank networks in the United States in the 1970’s. The inability to share customer
information with other banks was one reason that in the late 1960’s Bank of America
ceded control of its BankAmericard franchise network, the predecessor of Visa, to what
became the Visa International association.35
As discussed above, prepaid cards are categorized as “open loop” and “closed
loop” cards, depending on whether they are usable only at a certain merchant. At one
time “closed loop” credit and charge cards issued by department stores and oil companies
were common in the U.S, and they are still issued in some emerging economies.36
C. Fee Structure and the Wal-Mart Settlement
The following is a description of the fee arrangements in a typical credit card
transaction, which differ only in limited respects from those of a debit card transaction:
Bank A issues a Visa credit card to Consumer X, who purchases a garment
for $ 100 at Store Y, which was "acquired" for Visa by Bank B. Visa rules
mandate that Bank B must pay Bank A an interchange fee of 1.25% of the
amount of the transaction, i.e., $ 1.25. Bank B will charge Store Y a
"discount fee" higher than $ 1.25 in order to recover the mandated
interchange fee and other fees that Visa rules mandate Bank B to pay Visa
on each and every Visa credit card (and debit card) transaction and to earn
a profit for itself. Thus, Bank B may charge a discount fee of 1.60% of the
transaction amount (or $ 1.60) to Store Y. When Store Y presents
35

See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic: the Digital Revolution in Buying and
Borrowing (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) (2nd ed.) (“Evans and Schmalensee”), at 72-73. Page references
below to Evans and Schmalensee are to the 2nd edition.
36
So-called “private label” credit cards in the United States today normally bear the logo of a merchant but
also a Visa or MasterCard logo; because of the Visa or MasterCard affiliation they can be used at other
merchants’ locations.
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Consumer X's $ 100 Visa transaction to Bank B, the bank will credit Store
Y's account for $ 98.40, send the Visa mandated $ 1.25 interchange fee to
Bank A and retain the $ .35 balance of the "discount fee."37
Other than the fact that Consumer X’s bank account at Bank A will be debited
rather than having credit extended, there is little difference between the described credit
card transaction and a debit card transaction except the revenue structure for the issuing
bank. When a consumer pays by debit card, there is no revolving credit extended and no
possibility of interest income for the card issuer as in a credit card transaction, so the
issuer’s principal revenue source is the interchange fee.
However, interchange fees on PIN debit transactions in the United States have
been limited, for historical reasons. Debit cards were introduced in the U.S. in the 1970’s
as “ATM cards,” used only for withdrawing cash from automatic teller machines. When
in 1986, some banks belonging to interbank networks began to transform ATM cards into
online PIN debit cards by persuading merchants, particularly gas stations and
convenience stores, to install equipment to accept them,38 consumers resisted having to
pay a fee for online debit card transactions to use their own money. Merchants, too,
objected to being charged interchange fees for point of sale (“POS”) debit card
transactions when no such fees were paid on ATM card transactions, and many
merchants instituted per-transaction fees.39 Consequently, low bank fees became the rule
for PIN debit.
As a result of the low interchange fee structure for PIN debit compared to credit
cards, prior to about 1990, banks in the U.S. displayed little interest in issuing debit cards
except as a convenience to their customers for use at ATM’s. Due to the fees they were
charged for using a debit card other than at their own bank’s ATM, relatively few
consumers used them to make purchases and few merchants installed equipment to accept
them.40 Online debit cards did not become widespread in North America until the
1990’s.41
About 1990, Visa embarked on a campaign to promote the use of debit cards. To
overcome the problem that interchange fees on online debit cards were too low to entice
its member banks to issue more debit cards, Visa created a different form of debit card,
the “offline” or signature debit card, which would work like Visa credit cards and involve
an interchange fee set only slightly lower than the interchange fee issuers would receive
on credit cards.42 The new signature Visa debit cards would be a better deal for issuers,
that would rake in more interchange fees than on online debit cards; the same or a better
deal for consumers, who in some cases still would have to pay transaction fees, but in
some cases would not; and a worse deal for merchants, that would see more of their
37
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receipts disappear in the form of fees and chargebacks. MasterCard followed suit with a
similar signature-based debit card strategy.43
This division of the debit card market was unique to the United States. In no
other country are signature-based debit cards regularly issued by financial institutions.44
In Canada, there is only one form of debit card transaction: online debit cards; and there
is only one debit card network. There have never been interchange fees; the Canadian
debit card network is run at par, like the American check collection system.45 However,
Canadian consumers even today pay higher transaction fees for the use of debit cards
than Americans; banks charge the consumer instead of the merchant.46
The only flaw in the Visa and MasterCard strategy was the reluctance of
merchants to accept signature-based cards when they could require consumers to use
online debit cards and thereby lose less money in fees. However, to overcome this
problem, Visa and MasterCard relied on a clause in the standard merchant-merchant
acquirer contract called the “Honor All Cards” (“HAC”) Clause, which required
merchants to accept any card with the Visa or MasterCard logo. In effect, they said to
merchants that if they wanted to accept credit cards, they had to accept signature debit
cards.
The HAC Clause was the subject of a class action antitrust lawsuit, Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.,47 in which a class of over five million merchants represented
by Wal-Mart, The Limited, Sears and several other large retailers as named plaintiffs
sued Visa, MasterCard and other associations, challenging the HAC Clause as an illegal
“tying” arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act. The retailers alleged that they
wanted to accept Visa and MasterCard credit cards and online debits but not the offline
signature debit cards. After almost nine years of litigation, a three billion dollar
settlement of the lawsuit was approved in January 2005, the largest ever in an antitrust
case.48
43
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As a result of the Wal-Mart settlement, the debit card industry in the U.S. is
undergoing a reorganization in which control of the industry’s future is in the balance.
Along with it, the charge card industry, led by American Express,49 is going through
major changes as well. MBNA, the largest U.S. card issuer, is now issuing American
Express cards, and Citibank plans to do the same.50 Meanwhile, Wal-Mart, free of the
“HAC” Clause since the District Court initially approved the settlement in 2003,
negotiated a temporary 30% drop in the interchange fee as part of the settlement, then
temporarily stopped accepting MasterCard signature debit cards to keep fees down.
Debit card interchange fees have been in flux since thattime .51
Meanwhile, merchants, banks and card networks jockey for leverage. Wal-Mart
teamed with GE Consumer Finance and Discover to issue its own “private label” debit
card, and is issuing prepaid debit and credit cards that can be used by people without a
bank account.52 Discover purchased Pulse, one of the largest online debit card
networks.53 Other retailers, such as Publix Super Markets of Florida, are offering free
use of their proprietary ATM’s only to the customers of banks that waive interchange
fees.54 The outcome remains uncertain, as is the effect on consumers. Efforts by
consumers to piggyback on Wal-Martby filing consumer class actions against Visa,
MasterCard and others have been unsuccessful due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois55 denying standing to indirect purchasers, such as
consumers, to bring actions under the antitrust laws on the theory that inflated costs were
passed through to them.
D. Chargeback Rules
Major payment card networks, such as Visa and MasterCard, operate chargeback
systems by which transactions can be reversed and the price charged back to the seller
through the network, and credited to the consumer’s account. The chargeback systems
are governed by network association rules that are contractually binding on both card
issuers and merchant acquirers, such as the Visa Operating Regulations.56 Chargeback
rules differ by region.
Typically, chargeback rules provide that if a dispute is of a type that is subject to
chargeback, once the consumer has made a good faith attemptto resolve the dispute with
49
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the merchant, the card issuer must investigate. If it determines the consumer’s complaint
is justified, the charge to the consumer’s account must be reversed by the card issuer.
Under association rules, binding between banks under contract law, the issuer then may
pass on the resulting claim for a refund to the merchant acquirer. The merchant acquirer
then is entitled to debit the merchant’s account to satisfy that claim.57
Chargeback may provide the consumer with recourse for certain common
problems. “I cancelled the transaction but didn’t get credit on my statement”; “I lost my
card [or it was stolen] and someone used it to buy something”; “someone stole my
information and card number and used it to buy merchandise on my account or to
withdraw money from my bank account” (a/k/a “identity theft”); “I never received the
goods”; and “the amount on my statement is wrong” are all common complaints that can
be grounds for a chargeback. Grounds for chargebacks are assigned separate
“chargeback reason codes”; Visa U.S.A. currently recognizes 24 reason codes, while
MasterCard has 18 and Discover has 14.58
However, the chargeback system is operated by Visa, MasterCard and other
associations to resolve disputes between banks and between banks and merchants, not
between consumers and merchants. Consumer protection laws generally regulate the
consumer-card issuer relationship and the consumer-merchant relationship, but not the
multilateral relationship among consumers, banks and merchants that characterizes the
credit and debit card systems. The issuer’s right to pass on the claim to the merchant
acquirer is a contractual right of the issuer, not a right of the consumer. Issuers have little
incentive to pursue chargeback except to the extent they are compelled by law or contract
to recredit the consumer’s account.
Laws enacted in the United States, UK and several EU countries that preserve
against the card issuer claims and defenses the consumer may possess against the
merchant have acted as a spur to card associations and issuers to adopt chargeback rules.
In the United States, §170 of the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”)59 permits credit
cardholders to raise against the issuer any claims or defenses they may have against the
merchant, on certain conditions: (1) the cardholder made a “good faith attempt” to
resolve the dispute with the merchant; (2) the transaction exceeded $50; (3) the initial
transaction occurred in the same state or within 100 miles of the cardholder’s billing
address; and (4) claims or defenses are limited to the balance remaining on the card when
the cardholder first notifies the card issuer or merchant of the claim or defense.
However, laws on reversibility, with the exception of Denmark’s and Israel’s,60
57
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contain different protections for credit and debit card holders. In the United States and
UK, for example, only consumers who pay by credit card and not those who pay by debit
card retain against the card issuer product related claims and defenses such as breach of
warranty and failure of the goods or services to conform to the contract between the
consumer and the merchant or to reasonable standards.61 In Denmark protections are the
same for different types of cards, but do not include preservation of defenses against the
card issuer in case of defective and non-conforming goods and services.62 Without the
impetus of a law entitling the consumer to withhold payment from the card issuer in such
cases, card issuers have little incentive to initiate chargeback procedures based on these
types of claims and defenses, and consumers therefore have no effective remedy against
merchants in many cases due to the high transaction costs of pursuing them.
Moreover, chargeback procedures were not designed as an optimal solution for
the resolution of disputes between consumers and merchants, but to resolve disputes
between issuer banks that issue payment cards and merchant acquirer banks that
“acquire” merchants for the payment system and handle their accounts. Consumers lack
standing to pursue remedies through the chargeback process. Because chargeback
systems are matters of private law between banks, there are at least four features of an
adequate consumer-merchant dispute resolution system that they lack: (a)
comprehensiveness; (b) transparency; (c) access to information; and (d) competence.
The OECD conducted a major study of chargebacks in 1996.63 Its conclusion was
that “[p]ayment card companies, as financial intermediaries, may be in the best position
to address consumer concerns by performing a broad spectrum of `chargeback’ redress
functions, as they do for example in the United States.”64 The OECD’s Report on
Consumer Protections for Payment Cardholders, issued in 2002, echoed this view.65 A
number of academic studies have also advocated expansion of chargeback procedures as
a means of dispute resolution in cyberspace.66 These studies have been primarily
concerned with the use of chargeback procedures to resolve cross-borderdisputes arising
out of electronic commerce.
Certain countries require card associations to enforce a chargeback regime for
domestic transactions, and some card associations have voluntarily extended their
domestic regime to cover international transactions.67 These regimes generally cover
unauthorized transactions and billing errors, and some also cover product- and servicerelated disputes. They vary in the extent to which consumer fault affects the consumer’s
5746-1986 (Israel), §§5 and 9, with the Act on Certain Payment Instruments, Act No. 414 of May 31, 2000
(Denmark), §11.
61
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65
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66
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right to reverse the transaction.
The consumer is entitled to reversal of unauthorized transactions in several
countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Korea,
Mexico, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the United States.68 However, several countries,
including Belgium, Denmark, Korea, Norway and Sweden, follow a fault standard which
allows liability to shift back to the consumer in certain cases.69
Fault standards are of two types. One standard shifts liability back to the
consumer if the consumer was at fault in enabling the defrauder to use the card, e.g., by
negligently losing the card or giving it to a third party. Such standards may include
varying degrees of shifting depending on the degree of fault; for example, in Belgium,
there are different ceilings of liability for consumer negligence and for “extreme”
negligence.70 They also may require more than mere negligence, as in Korea where a
“serious mistake” is required, and in the UK where “gross negligence” will shift liability
back to the consumer.
The other type of fault that can shift liability back to the consumer is delay in
notifying the issuer of loss or theft of the card or other circumstances that give rise to a
risk of misuse. Standards in some countries are more specific than others; they may state
a particular number of days from notice of the loss or theft, they may give a reasonable
time; or they apply only upon receipt of a bank statement reflecting unauthorized
transactions, shifting liability prospectively for any further unauthorized transactions.
The latter is a type of “bank statement” rule, similar to rules in the United States
according to which delay in reporting errors or unauthorized transactions after receipt of
a checking account or credit card statement reflecting the error or unauthorized
transaction can estop the consumer from obtaining a recredit to his or her account.71
Billing errors, such as duplicate charges, are another type of chargeback. In
general, chargeback regimes require correction of billing errors. Some, as in the United
States, require that the consumer’s account be recredited while the error is being
investigated, unless the investigation is concluded within a fixed, and brief, time frame.72
The other principal type of consumer dispute covered by some chargeback
regimes is product- and service-related disputes, such as non-delivery or nonperformance by the merchant and delivery of goods in defective condition or in nonconformity with the consumer’s contract with the merchant.
Non-delivery tends to be covered by chargeback regimes, but issuers are less
enthusiastic about intervening in disputes over product quality and conformity with the
underlying contract, and this is reflected in consumer protection laws. In the United
States,73 the U.K., Austria, Canada, Finland, and Greece74 who pay by credit card have
the right of chargeback against the issuer when goods arrive in defective or nonconforming condition, or when they have any other claims or defenses against the
68
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merchant that would give them the legal right not to make the payment. Debit card
holders, however, do not have these rights.75 Among OECD member countries, only
Denmark’s laws provide debit and credit cardholders equal chargeback rights, and
Denmark does not provide for chargeback in product- and service-related disputes.76
III.

Debit and Prepaid Cards in Emerging Economies
A. China: Explosive Growth in Debit Cards as Government Policy

The People’s Republic of China, apart from Hong Kong, was almost exclusively a
cash economy until very recently, but much has changed. A study published by China
UnionPay (“CUP”) in December 2004 revealed that as of June 2004, 685 million debit
cards had been issued in China,77 compared with about 300,000 as of 1990 and about
eight million as of 1995.78 The number of debit cards grew 64% in 2002 alone, and rose
from 544 million to 663 million during 2003.79 In comparison, according to the study,
there were 29 million other bank cards in circulation.80
The proliferation of debit cards is the result of a central bank policy called the
“Golden Cards Project,” started in 1993.81 Its purpose was to prepare the country's
infrastructure for a national electronic payments system that would move payments in
China from cash to chip (“Smart”) cards.82 To build this infrastructure it was necessary
to establish a national switching system, with sixteen regional centers, to combine the
several incompatible card payments systems already established by Chinese banks.83
Before the switching system, payment cards were difficult to use due to incompatibility
among the systems used by Chinese banks.84
The concentration on issuance of debit cards rather than credit cards was
compelled, in part, by the lack of any national credit information system in China prior to
2004. Moreover, because 92% of personal consumption expenditure was in cash, it was
logical to focus on displacing cash with debit cards85 rather than inducing Chinese
75
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consumers to change to an American-style credit card culture. The Golden Payment Card
program also was seen as a counterinflationary measure to control the money supply, a
function that ruled out card-based credit.86 Accordingly, the cards are usable at ATM’s
and points of sale, but do not have a credit function.
However, issuance of cards does not mean that they are used. Only about three
percent of China’s merchants accept payment cards.87 It is not uncommon for an
individual to own six or seven debit cards. “Sleeping cards” are a problem; about twothirds of the 685 million debit cards issued are unused,88 and recently the four stateowned banks began to charge annual fees for debit cards in order to cull dormant cards.89
Other banks, however, have not followed suit. Foreign banks, meanwhile, are forbidden
from extending credit to persons other than foreigners until January 1, 2007.90
China remains predominantly a cash economy, but according to the Nilson
Report, card spending grew to nearly 10% of all retail sales revenue in 2004 from 2.7% in
2001, mostly on debit cards.91 People’s Bank of China gives a more conservative, but
still telling, estimate that cards account for five percent of retail sales volume in 2004, up
from two percent in 2001.92 However, payment cards accounted for as much as 20% of
retail sales revenue in the major cities of Beijing and Shanghai.93
Credit cards have not gained as much in popularity as debit and prepaid cards, and
overwhelmingly they are used for commercial purposes. Of about 29 million credit cards
extant in China as of June 2004, 24 million were secured by guarantee deposit accounts.94
These secured credit card accounts carry extremely high interest rates for overdrafts.
Those credit cardholders that do exist in China rarely carry balances from month to
month; as in Japan, credit cards are primarily used as cash substitutes in China.95
Prepaid cards are also becoming common in China,96 and the unbanked
86
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population remains large. Personal bank accounts started in the late 1980’s but became
generally available only in April 2000, and checking accounts are generally limited to
business and institutional users.97 ATM’s are scarce in many parts of China, and bank
customers have to wait in line to deposit and withdraw cash.
The Chinese government’s incentive to encourage electronic payments may have
been bolstered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Weak domestic consumption
was seen as one of the culprits. In 2000, South Korea took more extreme measures to
encourage consumption, in the hope of warding offa repetition of the crisis. In a debacle
reminiscent of the October, 1966 credit card giveaway in Chicago98 which created the
momentum for the enactment of the TILA, more than 57 million credit cards were issued
within one year to South Koreans, with lax underwriting.
Recipients did not, for the most part, use the cards for purchases; rather, they went
on a binge of drawing cash advances and spent the cash.99 This credit card boom
precipitated a bust in 2002 and a crisis of overindebtedness in South Korea, the effects of
which are still reverberating in that country.100 The nation’s second-largest card issuer,
LG Card, lost 5.59 trillion won (over five billion U.S. dollars) in a single year.101 Credit
card issuance is growing rapidly in Thailand, but stricter underwriting there has resulted
in more modest growth in consumer debt.102
B. Russia: Payroll Cards and Overdraft Credit
The American Chamber of Commerce in Russia describes the use of payment
cards as “exploding throughout Russia.”103 About 22 million cards are in circulation and
the number is expected to exceed 32 million by the end of 2006.104 However, only six
percent of card transactions are retail payments; most cards are payroll cards used to
withdraw cash from ATM’s.105 According to the Central Bank of Russia, 97% of the
10.6 million cards issued by Visa and MasterCard in Russia are deferred debit cards
linked to bank accounts.106 There are also 11.1 million “private label” cards, mostly debit
cards, issued by domestic banks such as Sberbank. Of the latter, 4.7 million are “smart
97
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cards,” using chip technology, that can be used for purposes other than payments.107
Most cards that are not payroll cards, possibly as many as nine million cards, are
reportedly “overdraft” cards bearing high fees and only available for small overdrafts of
bank accounts.108 Only about four percent of payment cards in Russia are credit cards.
The principal impetus to payment cards in Russia was the adoption of a flat tax of
13% in 1998, which has substantially cut down on the past practice of “black” salary
payments and resulted in direct deposit of salaries into bank accounts, linking many
people to the banking system for the first time. However, a major Russian online
merchant, Yandex, reports credit cards “have yet to catch on in Russia,” so paid services
on the Internet are not a big moneymaker.109 Bankers describe trying to “develop the
payment culture of Russians” to “overcome a psychological barrier” and pay with credit
cards, and do not expect credit cards to exceed 30% of all bankcards issued in Russia in
2005.110 An amendment to Article 212 of the Taxation Code, effective February 1, 2005,
gave banks permission to offer an interest-free grace period requirement on credit and
overdraft cards – banks are otherwise forbidden from waiving interest on extensions of
credit - which may enhance their attractiveness.111
C. Brazil: Debit Card Growth and the Cash Economy
According to one recent estimate, Brazil has 135 million debit cards and 45
million credit cards in circulation.112 About one-third of Brazil’s population now has a
bank account.113 The figure is about 43% for urban residents.114
Like China, Brazil is predominantly a cash economy. 77% of urban Brazilians
continue to use cash for all payments, even utility bills.115 Of 70 billion dollars (U.S.) in
annual private consumption, 15% is paid electronically.116 Checks never were a major
way to make payments in Brazil; only 61% of bank account holders – about 20% of the
population – even have access to checking facilities today, and this figure was far lower
several years ago when credit cards were being introduced.117
Debit card transactions are growing in Brazil by 60% annually as opposed to 20%
annual growth in credit card transactions.118 Meanwhile, check volume is decreasing by
3.4% per year.119 While debit cards help preserve the predominant cash economy,
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however, problems of overindebtedness involving credit card use are growing in Brazil.
About 25% of Brazilian consumer bankruptcy cases involve credit card debts.120
While Brazil, the world’s ninth largest economy, represents by far the largest
market for e-commerce in Latin America, exceeding 3.8 billion USD in e-commerce in
2003, and has the largest number of Internet users in the region (14 million as of the end
of 2003),121 as of 2001 only about two-thirds of Latin Americans who bought online were
using any kind of payment card to make their purchase,122 while over 90% of Americans
and Western Europeans use credit cards to make online purchases. Also, the number of
mobile telephone users, about 37.4 million as of the end of 2003, far exceeds the number
of Internet users, and 10 million Brazilian consumers are expected to be using mobile
payment systems by the end of 2005.123
D. Mexico: Prepaid Cards for the Unbanked
Mexico, the second largest market in Latin America, displays the same pattern as
Brazil of the dominance of the cash economy and debit cards. Fewer Mexicans than
Brazilians are “banked”; only 25% of urban Mexicans have a bank account.124 However,
75% of economically active Mexicans carry a debit or prepaid card, compared with just
25% who carry a credit card.125 Only 12% of purchases in Mexico are made with credit
cards,126 and only 160,000 businesses in the country of 105 million people accept credit
cards.127 To make it easier for lower-income people to use cards, MasterCard in 2004
began offering prepaid cards in Mexico.128
The spread of debit and prepaid cards has to a great extent coincided with the
spread of mobile telephones, and the prepaid phone card is often the first exposure of
consumers to electronic payments. As in Brazil, mobile telephones dominate the
Mexican telephone market; there are over 28 million of them, compared with fewer than
half as many fixed lines. The dominant way to pay for telephone service in Mexico is
with prepaid phone cards; over 23 million of the 28 million mobile subscribers pay for
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service in this way.129 The average denomination of phone card is $10 US, yet the
average expenditure is about $12 US per month.130 This means that the average
subscriber is buying a new phone card more than once a month. TelCel, the dominant
cellular telephone service provider, maintains over 400,000 points of sale for phone
cards, including mom-and-pop stores and street vendors, to satisfy the demand.131
E. Southern Africa: Mobile Payments and Smart Cards
Nowhere has cell phone use grown more than in Africa over the past five years.132
As many as 97% of people surveyed in Tanzania said they had access to a mobile phone,
though only 28% had access to a landline.133 Cell phones are revolutionizing African
economies by overcoming barriers created by poor transportation networks, postal
systems and fixed telephone systems.
Cell phones are starting to be used to make mobile payments in southern Africa.
In Zambia, for example, 300 small businesses that sell Coca Cola have begun using cell
phones to pay for their inventory.134 In Zambia, too, gasoline stations, dry cleaners,
restaurants, and scores of other retail shops let customers pay by cell phone.135
Only about forty percent of the population of the Republic of South Africa has a
bank account,136 but the SIM cards used in the GSM cellular phones that are standard in
South Africa are “smart cards” that contain microchips and are capable of performing
payment functions.137 As of January 1, 2005, all new debit and credit cards issued in
South Africa are required to be smart cards, and all pension payments handled by the
South African Department of Social Welfare will move to a smart card system from 2005
onward.138 Visa cards are growing by about 43% per year in South Africa,139 but debit
cards are growing more than credit cards, as the lack of bank accounts and lack of
creditworthiness of much of the population limits the issuance of credit cards.140
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F. India: Debit Cards and Access to Bank Services
In India, debit cards have become immensely popular, while credit card
penetration is low and credit card holders tend to pay their balances in full each month.141
One reason may be that Indians, despite their generally impoverished condition, have a
relatively high rate of owninga bank account. A survey of residents o f Uttar Pradesh and
rural Andhra Pradesh revealed that 47.5% had bank accounts.142 The high population
density in India, even in rural areas, means that large numbers of people live close to a
bank branch. Thus, while the average population per branch in Brazil was 9,331 and the
area per branch was 470 sq. km., the corresponding figures in India were 14,888 and 44
sq. km., respectively.143
Mobile payments, however, have not yet become common in India as they have in
southern Africa. Sumitomo Bank, together with a Chicago-based company, has just
recently introduced a “mobile electronic wallet” as a service to its customers, but it is a
luxury item for the affluent.144 Elsewhere in Asia, however, particularly in South Korea,
mobile payments are rapidly increasing in use.145
However, globally mobile payments are hampered by the slow speeds at which
most mobile telecommunications networks still operate, and by high per-minute charges
for use of cell phones in developing countries, especially where mobile telephone service
suffers from monopolistic or oligopolistic practices. As G3 packet switched data
networks, the newest and fastest GSM mobile telephone systems, become more
widespread and as calling charges go down, mobile payments are expected to rapidly
gain popularity as a way to make small payments, particularly in high crime areas where
carrying cash and payment cards presents a risk of theft.146
IV. Debit and Prepaid Cards in Developed Economies
A. Marginalization of Credit Card Culture
As debit and prepaid cards proliferate globally, the American and Canadian
addiction to credit cards is increasingly marginalized. Meanwhile, Western and Central
Europe and Scandinavia are divided into two payment cultures. Some countries like
Germany rely heavily on giros, which are deferred debit transactions,147 while in others
such as France and the United Kingdom credit cards have a larger profile, though not
141
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nearly as large as in North America.
In Japan, credit card use also exceeds debit and prepaid card use. However, Japan
maintains the institution of ikkai barai, loosely translated as “payment in one cycle.” In
about 85% of Japanese credit card transactions the card is used to arrange a prescheduled
debit transfer as in the case of the giro in Europe. At the cash register, the consumer
makes the decision that the transaction will be paid to the issuer in full on the next
monthly payment date, and authorizes a debit transfer out of his or her account to pay the
transaction shortly after the last day of the payment cycle. “Because the cardholder at the
point of purchase already has given the issuer access to a specified amount of funds in a
specified account, the transaction resembles much more closely an American debit card
transaction than an American credit card transaction.”148 Apart from Japan and the credit
card giveaway in South Korea, nowhere in Asia or other developing regions are credit
cards as widely used as debit and prepaid cards.
The failure to recognize the anomalous nature of American and Canadian
payment culture is a flaw in the work of the leading American scholar on payment
systems, Ronald Mann. In a 2002 article149 Prof. Mann attempted to explain why
Japanese consumers use both credit cards and debit cards far less than American
consumers, and why when they use credit cards, the payment arrangements tend to
resemble a deferred debit transfer rather than a loan, with the balance automatically
deducted from the cardholder’s bank account at the end of a billing cycle.
Calling the credit card “the dominant card-based payment system in the world,”150
Prof. Mann concludedthat the credit card is “likely to languish as a relatively minor
system” in Japan, because “[f]inancial systems that develop in one country cannot be
transplanted without change to other countries that have different institutional
settings.”151 Yet, even in 2002, credit cards were not the dominant card-based payment
system outside North America and a few countries in Western Europe. The immensity of
the American economy obscures the status of Americans as outliers in relying on credit
cards as a source of financing instead of convenience.
Moreover, payments by direct debit transfer in Japan dwarf the volume of
payments by credit card. 53% of all non-cash payments in 1990, and 51% in 1997, in
Japan were by direct debit transfer compared with 9% and 10% of payments by credit
card and 9% and 5% by check in those years, respectively.152 Direct debit transfer –
authorizing a merchant to debit one’s bank account – is also a dominant payment method
in Germany – the giro - and is common in the UK, France and Italy.153 The dominance
of direct debit and ikkai barai is functionally consistent with payment methods common
both in Japan and Europe, but differs from the use of credit cards in North America.
Japan is not an anomaly with a unique payment culture. Rather, there is a
functional equivalence between Japanese use of credit cards as “convenience cards,”
payment by direct debit transfer, and the use of debit and prepaid cardsfor convenience
148
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in much of the world outside North America.154 Japanese cardholders prefer to have the
option of rolling over a balance on their cards, an option that debit cardholders in China,
Russia or India do not yet have due to both a lack of credit information systems and their
relatively impoverished circumstances; but the Japanese exercise that option relatively
infrequently. Moreover, Prof. Mann himself has more recently noted the trend in the
United States toward (or back to) use of credit cards for convenience rather than as a
source of financing.155
In 2005, nowhere other than in the United States and, arguably, Canada do credit
cards still predominate among card-based payment systems.156 Even in the UK, where
payment habits before the advent of payment cards were more similar to those in the
United States than in continental Europe, the debit card payment volume of £108 billion
in 2003 exceeded credit card volume of about £100 billion.157 Given the trend in favor of
debit card use even in the United States and Canada, they might not continue to
predominate there, either. However, if Americans are unable to substantially change
their payment habits, it is they who will remain out of step with the rest of the world in
their use of credit cards.
As long ago as 1999 – a long time when discussing payment cards - the Bank for
International Settlements study of the G10 countries and Australia recognized the trend
toward debit card dominance: “[O]nly in Canada, Japan and the United States are credit
card payments still a significantly greater percentage of non-cash payments than debit
cards.”158 Prof. Mann’s study of the Japanese use of credit cards demonstrates that even
in Japan, the dominance of the credit card as a non-cash payment method is illusory.159
B. Europe: Checks and Giros
One European scholar has summed up payment habits in Europe as follows: “As
far as payment habits are concerned, traditionally there were two groups of countries in
Europe. On one side, Germany and the Netherlands characterized by large use of cash in
retail payments and transfers for remote transactions, and France and the UK on the other
side, where typically less [sic] retail payments were in cash, cheques were also largely
used.”160 In her view, checks “actually constituted an intermediate step between cash and
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cards.”161
Credit cards came into regular use in Europe not long after they did in the United
States, in the 1960’s, but did not receive the same degree of acceptance. The difference
in acceptance has much to do with differences in preexisting payment traditions: the
check in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Italy, direct credit
(account to account or “A2A”) and direct debit elsewhere in Europe.
In Germany, the Benelux countries, Switzerland and Scandinavia, unlike the U.S.,
the most common consumer payment system is the giro, a form of payment instruction
that traditionally was in hard copy like a check. In the giro the consumer can authorize a
merchant, such as a utility company, to withdraw payments from her bank account as a
direct debit transfer. Giros are commonly used to pay utility bills, telephone bills, taxes,
and other recurring obligations, and they are used in other countries such as Singapore as
well as in Europe. Giros could also take the form of a credit transfer; for example, a
common, and early, form of giro was the “postal giro” in which an amount was deposited
by the consumer at the Post Office together with instructions to pay creditors. In the mid1960’s, while American consumers were opening checking accounts in record numbers
and beginning to open credit card accounts, many European merchants were automating
their systems so that consumers could actuate a giro electronically at the point of sale. In
areas where the giro was well-established, neither checks nor credit cards became
popular.
Two studies from 1999 and 2001 illustrate this point; and it must be borne in
mind that if anything, checks see greater use in Europe, for example, than they did fifty
years ago. While in the U.S. as of 2001, almost 60% of non-cash payment transactions in
number were by check, only in France among the other G7 countries did the percentage
exceed 30%.162 While 74% of non-cash payment volume in the U.S. as of 1997 was by
check, and the figure had been as high as 82% six years earlier, in no other country
among the G10 countries and Australia did it exceed France’s 46%. Other than in
France, and Australia at 41%, in no other country among the G10 and Australia did
checks exceed 32% of non-cash payment volume, and in many checks are almost
unknown.163
Results of the Bank for International Settlements 1999 study, based on 1990 and
1997 data, are shown in the chart below:164
Table 1: Share of Non-Cash Payments, 1990/1997 (%)
Credit Card Debit Card
Check
Credit
Transfer
Australia
11/14
4/20
56/41
21/20
Belgium
2/3
8/19
24/8
58/60
Canada
30/31
0/22
63/31
4/9

Direct Debit
8/5
8/10
3/7
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France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US

0/0
1/2
1/7
9/10
0/0
0/1
4/4
11/13
16/19

14/22
0/2
0/5
0/0
2/18
5/17
3/9
3/18
0/4

60/46
10/6
46/32
9/5
15/3
15/2
6/1
52/31
82/74

16/18
52/48
50/46
29/34
62/52
73/76
85/72
21/19
1/2

10/14
42/37
3/10
53/51
21/27
4/7
2/4
13/19
1/1

Prof. Laura Rinaldi calls checks an “intermediate step between cash and cards.”165
There is an intuitive logic to this theory. The credit card system depends on the
cardholder’s paying the card issuer by another means of payment. One cannot pay off a
credit card with another credit card payment, except through a balance transfer, and at
some point, there has to be a way of paying the bill.
However, in the case of a country like Germany where remote transactions
traditionally were paid by giro, checks would be an unnecessary step, as giro would be
more secure for the merchant and in a jurisdiction with a non-par checking system,
perhaps less costly. Nor would an evolution from giro to credit card make sense, unless
the consumer intends to carry a balance as a loan; using a credit card would then require a
further payment transaction to pay the credit card invoice, either a check or a giro. In a
cash-and-carry culture in which consumers normally pay either in cash or by a direct
debit or credit transfer – i.e., in which one’s intent was to commit to transfer funds to the
card issuer as payment in full, either immediately or at the end of the month – as in Japan
and Germany, paying by credit card would serve no purpose other than, perhaps,
reallocating some of the burden of processing from the merchant to the card issuer. In
other words, while an evolutionary progression from cash to checks to credit cards makes
sense, a progression from cash to giro to cards would not.
Moreover, if credit cards become part of payment culture more readily in
countries in which consumers first become accustomed to paying bills by check, one
would expect to see a pattern of usage of checks and credit cards. Yet, in France, for
example, checks are the dominant method of payment, yet credit card usage is extremely
low, while debit card usage is increasing.166
It is sometimes assumed that the absence of checks in a national payment culture
makes it easy for payment cards to make inroads in a consumer population. Bankers,
including the Federal Reserve, often conceive of checks as a competing payment system.
However, evidence from Spain does not bear this out. Consumer payments by check in
Spain have never been as widespread as in Italy, the UK and France.167 “Partly because
of that,” said a leading European Commission-funded study, “Spain entered the stage of
payment cards quickly.”168 Yet, when Visa Espana and Spanish banks installed
“abundant” POS terminals and issued a large number of payment cards, they found that
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consumers were not using the cards – they continued to use cash.169
C. The North American Credit Card Habit
1. Explaining the Habit
If acquiring a check-writing habit pre-ordains acceptance of credit cards, the
United States provides a good example. Americans acquired a check-writing habit with
the assistance of the Federal Reserve Board which subsidized the costs of the U.S. check
clearing and collection system from 1918 to 1980. Beginning in 1915, the Federal
Reserve Board set up a national check clearing and collection system. Obviously there
were substantial costs of this system, totaling up to 500 million dollars per year, but from
1918 to 1980 the U.S. Federal Reserve Board elected to have the American taxpayer
absorb those costs by operating the system free of cost to member banks in order to
maintain check collection at par.170 Thus, a bank customer who deposited a check for
$100 would, in fact, be credited with $100 in his or her account, not $100 minus a fee for
the cost of clearing and collecting the check.
The use of checks grew enormously in the post-war United States, and checking
account customers were among the first to receive credit cards. In 1966 when Bank of
America decided to “go national” with the BankAmericard, predecessor to Visa,
competing banks in Chicago sent four million unsolicited credit cards to their existing
checking account customers, as well as other consumers they could identify, in an effort
to build their credit card business.171 It was the massive fraud resulting from this incident
that provided the initial impetus for TILA provisions prohibiting the distribution of
unsolicited credit cards.
Prof. Mann, in his recent Georgetown Law Journal article,172 has pointed to the
increasing use of credit cards as convenience cards. This is not new, but a return to pre1983 habits. Prior to about 1983 most American credit cardholders carried relatively low
balances, and they were stable or declined over time.173 However, after 1983 in the
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United States average credit card balances surged.174 As interest rates started to come
down in 1983, consumers ran up credit card debt, as shown in Table 2. The termination
of Federal Reserve subsidization of the check clearing and settlement system in 1980
also, by 1983, resulted in the imposition of checking account fees. Meanwhile, interestbearing money market accounts (“NOW accounts”) became available as a way of
avoiding the fees and earning interest on deposits thatwere seen as rapidly losing value
due to high inflation; however, those accounts were limited to two checks per month.
Thus, there was an economic incentive for consumers to charge purchases, then pay for
them with a check drawn on a money-market account.175
Table 2: Credit Card Balances and Interest Rates in the United States
Year
Average balance
% carrying a
Average most
176
common
per card with an
balance
active balance
interest rate on
credit cards177
1969
$776178
n.a.
n.a.
179
1983
$751
56.6
18.78
1989
$1362
57.9
18.02
1992
$1366
59.0
17.78
1995
$1852
61.9
15.79
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While in the 1977-83 period banks had cut back on issuing new credit cards,180 as
the economy improved in the 1980’s, banks loosened underwriting criteria and
consumers flocked in droves,181 attracted by interest rates that were fairly nominal when
adjusted for inflation which peaked in 1981 at around 13%.182 Accordingly, from 1980 to
June 1985, the average outstanding balance on active Visa and MasterCard credit card
accounts increased 28% in real (inflation-adjusted) dollars, while the number of accounts
grew by 41%.183
After 1983, however, the cost of funds to banks dropped from 13.5% to three
percent by the mid-1990’s, yet credit card interest rates remained virtually unaffected.
As credit card balances rose in the mid-1980’s, banks showed an abrupt increase in the
profitability of their credit card operations, and credit card interest rates displayed
reduced sensitivity to changes in the cost of funds.184 Various attempts have been made
to explain why competition among the more than 4,000 card issuing banks did not lead
credit card interest rates to follow these decreases in the cost of funds. Evans and
Schmalensee argue that issuer profits in fact fell during the 1990’s and that the high
interest rates were therefore justified by higher costs other than the cost of funds, such as
charge-offs due to consumer bankruptcies. Lawrence Ausubel posited that “many
consumers systematically underestimate the extent of their current and future credit card
borrowing and, using these underestimates, make suboptimal decisions regarding the
choice and usage of credit cards.”185
A consumer who thinks she can pay off her credit card balance whenever she
wants to will be less inclined to worry about the interest rate. The American consumer
was abetted in making her change of payment habits permanent by the escalation in home
values of the late 1980’s and 1990’s. As long as refinancing home mortgages and
thereby paying off accumulated credit card balances was an option, consumers did not
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worry too much as their balances grew.186
2. Resistance to Debit Cards
While differences between American payment habits and payment habits
elsewhere may have been shaped by historical factors such as the preexisting use of
checks or giros and inflation and the costs of credit at a crucial stage in the development
of consumer payment habits, it is the fee structure that shaped early resistance to debit
cards in the United States. Given the choice between being charged a $1.00 or $1.50 fee
by their bank to use a debit card at a point of sale and no fee to use a credit card,
consumers chose the credit card, even when they had a revolving balance and would be
charged interest in excess of the fee they avoided. In contrast, debit card fees at the point
of sale are relatively unusual in Europe, and only a small percentage of prepaid cards
involve payment of a per-transaction fee.
This phenomenon of incurring interest-bearing debt in order to avoid imposition
of an immediate fee is consistent with what behavioral economists call “hyperbolic
discounting,” the tendency for consumers to have higher discount rates for events
perceived as likely to occur far in the future than they do for events likely to occur in the
immediate future.187 One may never have to pay interest if the credit card balance is paid
currently, and in any event it is not incurred immediately and the amount is not known,
whereas the $1.00 or $1.50 fee imposed by one’s bank for use of a debit card at the point
of sale or at another bank’s ATM is charged immediately and is in a known or at least,
predictable amount.
However, since 2000, debit card payment volumes and cards in circulation have
grown rapidly in the United States. From 2000 to 2003, use of debit cards in the United
States grew 23.5% per year compared with 6.7% for credit cards,188 totaling 15.6 billion
debit card transactions compared with 19 billion credit card transactions in 2003.189
Debit cards today (2005) are used in about one third of all in-store transactions in the
United States, compared with 20% four years ago.190 Per household debit card spending,
$5,322 as of 2003, are expected to nearly double by 2008.191 However, debit card
payment volume remained less than half of credit card volume as of 2004.192
Debit cards have fared better still in Canada. In Canada in 2002, there were
already more debit card transactions than credit card transactions, but credit card
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purchases still totaled CD 135.7 billion compared to debit card use of CD 104.9
billion.193 However, debit card fraud is also higher in Canada than in the United
States.194
V.

Consumer Protection Policy Issues
A. Who Makes the Rules? Private Lawmaking and Public Policy in the
Regulation of Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions

Prof. Mann, in his recent Georgetown Law Journal article, asserts, “At its heart,
payments law must resolve four fundamental questions: who bears the risk of
unauthorized payments; what must be done about claims of error; when payments are
completed so that they discharge the underlying liability; and when they can be reversed.
The first three questions are categorically different from the last because they often
should be resolved based on the nature of the underlying technology….”195 Mann goes
on to argue that reversibility of payment card transactions is different, due to the
inequality of bargaining power between consumers and merchants, and that the TILA
legal regime designed to protect consumers against making imprudent borrowing
decisions, largely through disclosure requirements, should be reconsidered, as to payment
cards, as a means of “redressing an imbalance of leverage.”196
Parenthetically, it is odd that Prof. Mann omits any mention of regulation of fees
and penalties charged by banks for the use of payment cards. In 2004, the highest
percentage of all complaints to the Federal Reserve regarding state member banks
concerned card fees and penalties.197 The same is true of complaints about banks in the
U.K.198 To exclude laws (or the lack thereof) regarding the cost of making a payment
from “payments law” is analogous to excluding wage-hour laws, governing the cost of
labor, from “employment law,” or excluding rules regarding brokerage commissions and
the pricing of securities offerings from “securities law.”
Prof. Mann is not the first to call for reform of reversibility rules in payment card
transactions.199 One EC study said, “In relation to debit cards, charge back rules are
necessary, providing the consumer with the right to have the money transferred back on
193
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his demand, not only in case of fraud, but also where he avails himself of the right of
withdrawal [from the contract with the merchant].”200 The same study cited the need for
an “open and flexible regime” of consumer protection that could adapt to new payment
methods as they developed, and the consumer’s lack of anonymity online as mandating
privacy concerns.201 However, the study also emphasized the need for legislation rather
than reliance on self-regulation.
The proliferation of debit and prepaid cards in developing countries has been met
with regulatory inaction in most places. If the governments of developing countries such
as China, Brazil and India fail to establish regimes to regulate payment cards and, in Prof.
Mann’s words, “redress an imbalance of leverage,” then the question is whether the
payment card industry can be expected to do so itself as a set of private lawmakers.
Whether an imbalance of leverage with respect to reversibility will be redressed
voluntarily depends to some degree on the relationship between the perceived difficulty
of obtaining new merchants for the payment card association and the perceived difficulty
of attracting consumers to apply for and to use their cards.
There has been little difficulty in most countries in attracting consumers to obtain
debit and prepaid cards, as discussed above. In China, the process has been hastened by
government intervention. With respect to credit cards, a key limiting factor in most parts
of the developing world, with the notable exception of the South Korean credit card
debacle, has been banks’ unwillingness to issue them, largely due to the lack of credit
information systems. Moreover, as discussed above, consumers in most countries, and
even the majority of consumers in the U.S., tend to use credit cards for convenience
rather than run up an unpaid balance. Debit and prepaid cards do not present (at least, not
in the absence of an overdraft line of credit) an opportunity to indulge in
overindebtedness.
The primary limitation on the use of debit cards is the reluctance of merchants to
make the investment in equipment necessary to accept payment cards. That is why there
are so many “sleeping cards” in China; that is why South Koreans used their sudden
credit card wealth to take cash advances and spent the cash; that is why the proliferation
of debit cards in Brazil has not reduced the use of cash to the same extent as the
proliferation of credit cards did in the United States.
As long as private lawmakers in banks and card associations perceive that, on a
global level, consumers are more anxious to obtain and use payment cards than
merchants are to sign up and install the necessary equipment, their tendency will be to
make private laws that are favorable to merchants rather than consumers.
Another major factor is that it is banks and merchants, not consumers, that
comprise the membership of card associations, and the private lawmakers are bankers
and their attorneys. It is not surprising that association rules favor members of the
association over consumers, who are outsiders to the network.
The status of consumers as outsiders to the card association damages both the
transparency and legitimacy of self-regulation. Because the Visa and MasterCard
200
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associations regard chargeback procedures as ways of allocating losses between banks,
and not between consumers and merchants, they decline to disclose the rules to that
govern chargeback procedures to anyone not affiliated with a member financial
institution or regulatory agency. The rationale given by Visa USA is that the rules are
“proprietary and confidential information” in the nature of trade secrets, valuable to
someone who might want to start a competing system.202
This rationale is both implausible and insufficient. It is implausible, because there
are not likely to be any major new credit and debit card networks coming on the scene
that would significantly benefit from copying Visa’s and MasterCard’s chargeback
procedures. Other network associations such as the National Automated Clearing House
Association publish their rules and procedures and freely sell copies to non-members. It
is insufficient, because consumers have an interest in the rules that govern chargebacks,
since they affect the willingness of card issuers to recredit consumers’ accounts. Issuers
frequently recredit accounts even when not obligated to do so by consumer protection
laws, but it is important that such recrediting be done in a fair and non-discriminatory
fashion in accordance with rules and following adequate investigation of the consumer’s
complaint.
Besides lack of transparency, another defect in chargeback procedures is their
unfairness to the consumer. Again, because network associations regard chargeback
procedures as a private matter between their member banks rather than a consumer
protection system, the procedures are not designed to ensure that the consumer’s voice is
heard or that her interests are adequately represented.
The primary unfairness of the chargeback system to consumers lies in the fact that
in case of a dispute, nothing requires the issuer to do more than take the merchant’s word
for what happened. As a practical matter, this means that if the facts are in material
dispute, the issuer is likely to restore the charge to the consumer’s bill, on the theory that
the consumer has no defense to liability to the merchant, and leave it to the consumer to
pursue other remedies against the merchant – not an effective means of redress in many
cases.
Although American consumers have the right under TILA §170, subject to certain
limitations, to withhold payment from the issuing bank if they have paid with a credit
card and have a defense against the merchant, it is the unusual consumer who would risk
losing as much as 100 points in her credit score, as well as loss of credit card charging
privileges, by doing so. For these reasons, the volume of chargebacks in the United
States, which Prof. Mann characterizes as “quite small,”203 cannot be considered evidence
that consumers are overwhelmingly satisfied with the goods and services they purchase,
or that unauthorized transactions or other grounds for reversal of transactions are de
minimis. The high volume of complaints to the Federal Trade Commission about identity
theft in credit card transactions204 and the stagnant indices of consumer satisfaction in
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market research studies205 are evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, although chargeback rules generally provide for arbitration of disputes
between issuing banks and merchant acquirers, e.g., if the merchant is insolvent so that
one of the banks will bear the loss, this procedure only becomes applicable if the issuing
bank initiates a chargeback, and it is has no incentive to do so unless compelled by public
law to recredit the consumer’s account. The consumer lacks any right to initiate or
participate in the arbitration process – no right to invoke a hearing, no right to be present
or ask questions, no right even to know what the rules are.
That is not to say that the bodies of private law created by banks to govern
payment networks are entirely one-sided. For instance, the Operating Rules of the
National Automated Clearing House Association (“NACHA”), which govern ACH
payments in the U.S. and Canada, provide consumers the right to be “promptly credited”
with the amount of an unauthorized debit entry upon submittal of an affidavit demanding
the money.206 In contrast, the U.S. Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”) gives banks
ten business days to complete an investigation and recredit the consumer’s account in
case of an unauthorized electronic funds transfer.207
Banks and bank networks that operate payment systems have a number of reasons
to promulgate private rules that are not one-sided. First, banks and bank networks
generally have an interest in avoiding or minimizing the extent of government regulation
of new payment systems. When they have been regarded as being greedy and unfair in
treating consumers, legislatures have been prodded into enacting prophylactic legislation
to remedy the perceived abuses. A good example is the Expedited Funds Availability
Act,208 enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1987 in response to an outcry over banks’ placing
extended and unwarranted holds on deposits into customer accounts.
Second, banks and bank networks have an interest in uniformity. As networks
become global in scope, the risk of attracting adverse regulatory action by overreaching is
compounded. A network that spans five countries must keep five governments happy. If
any one is aroused to act, the network will have to change its rules accordingly, not just
in that single country, but network-wide. The widespread consequences of a misstep in
self-regulation that makes the system appear too unfair toward consumers mean that
banks and bank networks have an interest in maintaining a margin of safety. They not
only have an interest in being perceived as staying off the toes of consumers, but in
appearing to remain at least a few inches away from them.
At the same time, however, banks and bank networks have less need to be
concerned about governmental regulation in countries with small domestic markets. For
example, Visa International and its regional cooperatives, in designing its policies for
Africa, are likely to be guided more by a desire to satisfy merchantsin South Africa , the
largest African market, than by concern about adverse regulation in Burundi. Visa might
credibly threaten to curtail operations in a small, impoverished country, but not in a larger
market.
It has been argued that private lawmaking may be more likely to yield rules that
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promote efficiency where there is “regulatory competition.”209 However, Visa and
MasterCard as private lawmakers are more likely to compete to attract merchants than
consumers. Indeed, Visa has cited competition as its reason for keeping its chargeback
rules secret from the public.210
Overall, it is unlikely under present conditions that banks and card associations
will voluntarily adopt a reversibility regime that grants global consumers effective
chargeback rights. The fact is, for example, that their interest in uniformity has not been
strong enough to result in the universal extension of chargeback rights to product- and
service-related disputes, as TILA §170 did for many American consumers who purchase
with credit cards. The economic power of the U.S. market makes it worthwhile for banks
and card associations to comply with §170, but the rights granted by that section are
treated as idiosyncratic rights of consumers in the U.S. and those few other countries with
parallel legislation, not as a model to be followed globally.
This evidence raises troubling inferences for consumers in emerging economies
where debit and prepaid cards are proliferating. In many places these consumers may
face greater risk of merchant misconduct than consumers in the developed world, due to
the lack of effective law enforcement and unfamiliarity with modern payment systems.
Yet, overwhelmingly payment card issuers and card associations are self-regulating in
emerging economies, more so than in the U.S. and Western Europe where consumer
protection has a longer history. Nowhere is there a greater need for legislation to redress
the imbalance of leverage between consumers and merchants than in emerging
economies.
B. Reversibility of Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions
1. Transparency and Reversibility: a Proposal
Transparency in the chargeback system could play an important role in redressing
the existing imbalance of leverage between consumer and merchant. Private lawmaking
by card associations has rejected transparency, yet little thought seems to have been given
to date to legislation that would mandate a degree of transparency for the benefit of
consumers.
Private lawmaking by payment card associations has eschewed transparency for at
least two reasons. First, as discussed above, competition for merchants is more keen than
competition for consumers, especially in global markets in which payment cards are
proliferating faster than merchants equipped to accept them. Second, as behavioral
economists have observed, consumers tend not to consider the possibility of something
going wrong at the time when they enter into a transaction, let alone when they apply for
209
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a payment card that will facilitate future transactions; therefore, a transparent system for
resolving disputes would not confer any significant advantage on card issuers in
competing for consumer accounts.
The chargeback system lacks transparency in two particularly important respects.
First, the rules of the system, and the right to participate in chargeback arbitrations, are
open only to card association members.211 Second, perhaps more importantly, data about
the chargeback experience of individual merchants is kept confidential.
The card associations’ claim that chargeback rules are a trade secret has been
discussed above. However, more important is the unavailability of information about the
chargeback experience of individual merchants If a specific merchant has engaged in
misrepresentation of its merchandise or sold poor quality merchandise, resulting in a high
number of chargebacks, this is information that consumers should have available to them
when they are shopping.
Because card associations compete, through merchant acquirers, for merchant
memberships, and because merchants presumably prefer to keep negative information
about themselves confidential, it is in the interest of the associations to promise
merchants that chargeback information will be kept secret from the public.
Compare the card associations’ incentives with those of eBay, the online auction
service. eBay posts data about online merchants, including consumer ratings and
complaints, that is available to consumers when they make a purchase. Online merchants
have to overcome the remoteness of the transaction – consumers often are unfamiliar
with the merchant, yet have to rely on the merchant’s representations about merchandise
they cannot hold in their hands– in gaining consumers’ trust. eBay, anticipating this
problem, chose to require merchants to consent to release of data about them.
Visa and MasterCard could compile the same data as eBay, but they do not, or at
least, they do not make such data accessible to the public. It is in consumers’ interests to
have access to such information. Most merchants would ultimately benefit from ratings
based on chargeback experience, even if they do not perceive the release of the
information positively, because most have relatively few complaints.
What performs the same function as eBay’s ratings in consumer transactions with
most retailers is trade names and trademarks. Overloaded with information from
advertising, and confronted with choices frequentlytoo complex for rational decision making within their limited time available, consumers rely on the reputation of the
retailer to select where to shop, and on brand loyalty to choose products. As available
time for consumer decision-making becomes more limited, assuming a similar volume of
input of relevant information, reliance on brand loyalty increases.212
Regulatory intervention to mandate compilation and release of relevant
chargeback statistics for merchants that accept payment cards would be in the interests of
consumers, and would not present an insurmountable cost to issuers, merchant acquirers
or the card associations. Chargebacks are already coded according to the reason for
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reversal of each transaction.213 Codes that simply reflect voluntary exchange or return of
merchandise, for example, would not be held against a merchant; a merchant that
behaved properly in making an exchange would not incur negative consequences. Only
those codes reflecting culpable conduct by the merchant would be compiled. Chargeback
reason codes might have to be revised to clearly distinguish chargebacks that count
toward a merchant’s rating and chargebacks that are irrelevant to it.
For example, Visa U.S.A. currently has 24 chargeback reason codes, down from
44 codes with 59 subcodes that were in use prior to October, 2004.214 One, Visa Reason
Code 53, Merchandise/Service Not As Described or Defective Merchandise, is defined on
the Wells Fargo Online Merchant Services website as “[e]ither the customer claims the
goods or services received did not match the description/picture on your [the merchant’s]
Web site or other documentation/information they received from you, or the merchandise
arrived damaged, defective or otherwise unsuitable for the purpose sold. Additionally,
the customer claims the merchandise was returned, the service was cancelled, or they
attempted to resolve the dispute with you.”215 MasterCard Reason Code 53 and Discover
Reason Code RM are similar.216 In all chargeback systems, the merchant is given an
opportunity to credit the customer’s account or to explain why a credit is inappropriate.
It is proposed here that if the issuer rejects the merchant’s explanation, or receives
no explanation, or alternatively if the merchant does not credit the customer’s account
until the customer has had to complain to the issuer, a chargeback coded as Visa Reason
Code 53 or its equivalent MasterCard or Discover code would be counted in statistics
disclosed to the public regarding that merchant by the card association.
Other chargeback reason codes can readily be classified as countable or not
countable in the statistics, depending on whether they may reflect culpable conduct by the
merchant. Thus, for example, codes reflecting that items were illegible, that presentment
was late or that a card was declined obviously do not reflect on the merchant’s conduct,
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while codes for “altered amount” or “non-receipt of goods” may well reflect misconduct
by the merchant or its employees.217
If compilation of, and public access to, chargeback data were mandated by law, a
consumer interested in buying a washer-dryer could identify merchants carrying the
desired products, then research the merchants’ respective chargeback records, perhaps by
visiting a website where the data is posted. If one merchant has a poor record and the
other has a good record, consumers would benefit by being able to take those data into
account in choosing where to shop. However, it is highly unlikely that this proposal
would be effectuated through private lawmaking.
In a sense, it is odd that Visa and MasterCard have not chosen to pursue this idea
in the United States. Competition to acquire merchants for the network is considerably
lessened by the ubiquity of payment cards in this country. A merchant that does not
accept cards is likely to be very small, and most businesses that accept Visa, also accept
MasterCard and, for the most part, American Express.218 As debit and prepaid cards gain
market share in the U.S., there is proportionately greater need for card associations and
card issuers to compete for consumers and to try to steer them to more lucrative credit
card use, while there is less need to compete for merchants. The provision of chargeback
data could be restricted to consumers who own or use payment cards, increasing
consumer goodwill. Indeed, the data could be offered for a fee, with the fee waived for
consumers who use their cards regularly.
One function that greater transparency in the chargeback system would perform is
to deter merchant misconduct. Transparency seems to have had a beneficial effect in
deterring misconduct by merchants that do regular business on eBay. eBay maintains
ratings of online merchants by consumers, and displays the frequency of complaints.219
Merchants are given the opportunity to respond to particular complaints, and their
responses are also posted.
Another means of deterring merchant misconduct would be experience rating of
the discounts that are deducted from what merchants collect from credit and debit card
issuers. Currently, discount rates are standardized depending on whether the merchant
engages in remote transactions, in which the card is not presented by the customer. Mail
order-telephone order (“MOTO”) and Internet merchants, now collectively called “cardnot-present” or “MO/TO/EC” merchants,220 are at high risk for unauthorized charges, and
hence incur a higher discount rate than the roughly 1.6% discount that is deducted from
what “card-present” merchants receive from card issuers for transactions with customers
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using credit and debit cards.
Differentiation of discount rates according to card acceptance procedure will not
deter merchants from engaging in fraudulent practices or selling shoddy merchandise.
Currently the only sanction against merchant misconduct is to threaten to terminate a
merchant’s membership in the card association and access to the card network. This is
rarely used, and is not a nuanced approach to the problem.
An alternative would be to set discount rates according to a chargeback
experience rating system. Merchants that incur a higher proportion of certain types of
chargebacks that may indicate misconduct, relative to the total volume of transactions,
than other merchants would have a higher percentage discounted from what they collect
from card issuers. The types of chargebacks that would count in setting discount rates
would be determined by chargeback reason code.
Experience rating has been used or considered in many different contexts:
Workers’ Compensation systems for determining employer premiums for insurance
against employee injuries;221 medical malpractice insurance;222 disability insurance in the
Netherlands;223 Unemployment Insurance, and even ticket raffles.224 Banks, too, are
rated in the United States. The “CAMELS”225 rating is used by the Federal Reserve,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. to
determine the extent of supervisory activity and the levels of premiums charged to banks
for federal deposit insurance.
The problem with using experience rating in setting discount rates for individual
merchants is that after Wal-Mart, discount rates may be subject to negotiation based on
considerations that may have little to do with chargeback experience. Even if Wal-Mart
had a higher percentage of chargebacks than other merchants, its high volume of payment
card business strengthens its hand in negotiating a lower discount rate. In contrast, small
merchants are likely to be charged a higher discount rate despite favorable chargeback
experience. Public disclosure of merchants with adverse chargeback experience would
be more effective, and would not necessitate a retreat from negotiated discount rates.
2. Grounds for Reversal of Transactions
In most countries that have adopted regulatory regimes for payment cards,
provisions have been made for the correction of billing errors. Card association
chargeback rules permit chargebacks in cases of billing error. However, only in North
America and a few European countries are consumers permitted to initiate chargebacks
based on contract disputes between consumer and merchant, such as non-conformity of
221
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the goods with the contract, non-delivery or delayed delivery of goods, and defective
goods. In addition, bank statement rules – rules regarding the time and procedure for
giving notice of billing errors, and the effect of failure to do so – differ from country to
country.
One key issue regarding reversibility of debit and prepaid card transactions is
whether consumers should be entitled to reversal of transactions based on claims and
defenses arising out of the underlying contract between consumer and merchant. Prior to
1974, when TILA §170226 was enacted, it was a subject of considerable debate in the
United States whether credit card issuers should be regarded as if they were holders in
due course (“HDC’s”), like finance companies that financed consumer purchases of
automobiles, washing machines or other consumer goods based on a negotiable note or
chattel paper. If card issuers were HDC’s, they would have the right to recover from the
cardholder regardless of most types of defenses or claims in recoupment, such as breach
of warranty or fraud.227
A consumer who purchased a car or a washing machine that was a “lemon”
normally would have to pay the finance company that financed the purchase due to its
HDC status, and would be left with a claim against the merchant that sold her the
machine. Exceptions were made for lenders that purchased the note or chattel paper with
notice of a defense or claim, so-called “real” defenses such as illegality, incapacity,
bankruptcy discharge, and “fraud in factum,” and cases in which the lender was so related
to the merchant as to have constructive notice of consumer claims or defenses. It was
much debated in American law reviews whether charge slips on a credit card account
would be regarded as the equivalent of negotiable chattel paper or promissory notes, or
whether instead, consumer claims and defenses should be preserved.228
The debate of the early 1970’s over preservation of consumer claims and defenses
in payment card transactions was resolved in favor of the consumer with the enactment of
TILA §170.229 That section, in the nature of an anti-holder in due course rule, preserves
against the issuer any claims a consumer has against the merchant such as breach of
warranty, or defenses against the merchant’s right to payment for goods and services, if
(a) the consumer first made a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute, (b) the transaction
occurred within the same state as, or within 100 miles of, the consumer’s mailing
226
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address, and (c) the chargeback does not exceed the account balance when the consumer
first notifies the card issuer of the claim or defense. Whether a remote transaction over
the Internet or telephone occurred within the geographic limit is a question that has
received inconsistent answers from the American courts.230
No equivalent provision regarding preservation of claims and defenses exists in
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act with respect to debit card transactions, and none exists
regarding purchases with prepaid cards. Thus, authorized debit and prepaid card
transactions are final, as if they were cash transactions.231
Several non-U.S. jurisdictions have enacted laws enabling consumers to assert
against card issuers defenses or claims they have against merchants, other than duplicate
or erroneous entries and unauthorized transactions. These countries include Finland,
Greece, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway and the UK.232 However, with the exception of
Israel, 233 these countries’ laws universally draw a distinction between credit and debit
card holders, affording credit card holders the right to assert defenses and claims against
the issuer but not debit card holders.
In the 1970’s debate over preservation of claims and defenses, the banking
industry asserted that it was unfair to place liability on the issuer for merchant
misconduct, and that because the issuer is not able to limit its risk on debit cards by
placing a ceiling on the amount that can be withdrawn, the issuer’s risk is potentially
unlimited. On the other hand, consumer groups and a number of legal scholars raised
two counterarguments: (1) banks are in a position to “police” merchants that engage in
frequent misconduct and to prevent them from having access to the card network;234 and
(2) banks are in a better position to allocate risks through chargebacks and to pass on
losses through the discount rates imposed on merchants and in the case of credit cards,
through interest rates charged to consumers.235
Since the early 1980’s, excluding Professor Mann’s recent article,236 little has
been written on the subject of preservation of consumer claims and defenses against card
issuers, yet in countries that have yet to adopt consumer protection regimes, this is an
issue that should be decided. Since the early 1980’s, too, changes in conditions have
strengthened some of the policy arguments on the subject of preservation of claims and
defenses and weakened others. When EFTA was enacted in 1978, bankers were
concerned that consumer protection laws might restrain the growth of the debit card
networks or deter consumers from using the system.237 The opposite occurred; the
networks grew more because consumers had greater confidence.238
Instead, it is now the odd merchant in the United States that refuses to accept any
230

Compare Plutchok v. European American Bank, 143 Misc.2d 149, 540 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1989) and In re
Standard Financial Management, 94 B.R. 231, 239 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
231
EFTA §908(f), 15 U.S.C. §1693(f), lists types of “errors” that are subject to required error resolution
procedures. These are limited to unauthorized and incorrect entries on bank statements and to receipt of an
incorrect sum of money from an ATM.
232
OECD Report on Consumer Protection for Payment Card Holders, at 14-15.
233
Debit Cards Law (Israel), 5746-1986, §§5 and 9.
234
Littlefield, supra, at 493.
235
Geva, supra, at 55.
236
Mann, supra, 93 Geo. L.J. at 656.
237
Taffer, supra, at 235.
238
Id., at 234, citing the example of Wisconsin, which adopted an EFT statute in 1976.

39

kind of payment cards in face-to-face transactions.239 The same is true in Japan, parts of
Europe and the UK. Moreover, the merchant acquirer business – the banks that acquire
merchants for the network and handle their accounts – has developed into a highly
concentrated specialty in banking in which a small number of large banks and card data
processors handle vast numbers of merchant accounts, all of which are linked to and
contractually bound by the chargeback system.240 Additionally, in the United States, at
least, many bank debit card networks are linked to each other, further linking merchants
and banks regardless of which network they are on.
At the same time, due to the massively greater number of merchants that are part
of the payment card networks, “policing” merchants is no small job. The idea that card
issuers should be responsible for policing merchants within a limited geographic area,
that was incorporated into the Truth-in-Lending Act provisions on preservation of claims
and defenses,241 now seems quaintly archaic, as the Internet has made geography almost
irrelevant.
The argument raised by the banking industry that a bank’s liability on a debit card
transaction would be limited only by the amount in the card holder’s bank account also
seems dated, and made little sense to begin with. Credit card limits are commonly higher
than the cardholder’s bank account balance. Also, with merchants overwhelmingly being
linked to the chargeback system in the United States, it is unusual – though certainly not
unheard of242 – for a bank to be left without recourse to the merchant’s account when a
chargeback is found to be justified. However, the bank’s exposure is dependent on the
merchant’s solvency, not the solvency of the consumer, and merchant acquirers are
capable of screening out those merchants whose solvency is questionable.
In countries in which networks are just being established and in which merchants
may be reluctant to participate in the system and may be at greater risk of insolvency than
typical merchants in the United States, the arguments against preservation of consumer
claims and defenses have greater force. However, at the same time, the vast growth in
debit cards suggests that merchants even in those countries will prefer to participate in
payment card networks to remain competitive. Consumers, meanwhile, will use debit
cards more frequently if they have recourse to the chargeback system in case of problems
with the merchants with which they deal. As remote transactions grow with
improvements in telecommunications, consumer confidence is at a premium.
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B. Problems of Loss Allocation
1. Fraudulent and Unauthorized Transactions
In the United States, the consumer problem of greatest concern in payment
systems – indeed, the problem of greatest concern overall - is fraudulent transactions, and
particularly identity theft. 39% of consumer complaints to the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission in 2003 were for identity theft, and U.S. consumers rate it as their highest
priority among consumer issues, although the incidence of identity theft in credit cards
actually has begun to level off.243 On the other hand, debit card fraud in the U.S. is
growing rapidly.244 Debit card fraud is already at high levels in Canada.245
The high level of fraud in Canada occurs despite the fact that Canadian debit
cards are entirely PIN (online) debit. The linkage of all ATM’s to a single network,
Interac, in Canada and more frequent use of debit cards there are related causes. By
comparison, in the United States there are 25 different networks.246 On the other hand,
signature debit, unique to the United States, with a two- to three-day delay in clearance
and settlement, entails greater risk of loss due to non-payment in cases of insufficient
funds and closed bank accounts.
The problems of debit card users are similar to those of users of credit cards and
checks, particularly with respect to the allocation of loss due to unauthorized use, identity
theft and fraud. However, laws in many countries establish divergent rules and standards
for debit card users and the users of credit cards, checks and cash.
If a consumer in the United States loses a blank check on the bus, and a thief
forges the consumer’s signature, the loss normally falls on the payor bank absent fault on
the part of the consumer, but if the loss of the check was caused by the consumer’s
negligence, the consumer bears at least part of the loss on comparative fault principles.247
However, if the same consumer lost a credit card along with the check, and the
same thief used the credit card to make a purchase, the consumer’s liability would be
limited by law to a maximum of $50, regardless of the amount of the purchase, regardless
of the consumer’s negligence in losing the card, and regardless of the consumer’s further
243
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negligence in failing to review credit card statements.248 In the case of a credit card, the
loss ultimately would fall on the merchant, barring the merchant’s insolvency, assuming
that the card issuer pursued its right of chargeback under association (Visa or
MasterCard) rules.
Legal scholars have rationalized the $50 “small-dollar exclusion”as an attempt to
achieve optimal efficiency of the system by placing the obligation on the party who can
avoid the loss at the lowest cost.249 Professor Mann continues to argue for the smalldollar exclusion on the ground that in small transactions “claims to reverse payment
would more commonly be abusive than in the context of more significant purchases, if
only because it is difficult to imagine a legitimate basis for reversing payment in that
context.”250 This argument is incoherent. There is no logical reason why small-dollar
transactions would be more prone to abusive claims by consumers than large-dollar
transactions; in fact, the cost in terms of time and effort necessary to make a claim for
reversal of payment and the risk of being found out if the claim is abusive would likely
deter scoundrels from making fraudulent claims unless the dollar amount made it
worthwhile to do so.
The $50 ceiling was originally put forth in a seminal article in the Michigan Law
Review in 1971 as an “arbitrary” figure selected as a boundary between small purchases
in which credit cards normally would be used for convenience as a cash substitute, and
larger purchases which a consumer normally might expect to carry as a revolving credit
balance.251 The $50 ceiling was translated into a £50 ceiling in UK law, in §84 of the
Consumer Credit Act adopted in 1974.252 Again, however, transfers from deposit
accounts were excluded. Section 84 was said to be an exception to the general rule of
§83 of the Consumer Credit Act that a debtor under a regulated consumer credit
agreement is not liable for loss “arising from use of the credit facility by another
person….”
In the case of debit cards, American law attempts to have it both ways. The
consumer’s liability for unauthorized debit card transactions is limited to $50 – but only
if he or she reports the loss to the issuer within two business days after discovery.253 For
the consumer who fails to report promptly, the ceiling is raised to $500 for charges
beyond the two business days, and to unlimited liability for charges on the lost card once
a consumer has had 60 days to review a credit card statement reflecting unauthorized
charges and still has failed to report the loss.254 The consumer’s duty is to be a prompt
reporter and careful reader of statements from her bank, but not (apart from the nowminor risk of a $50 liability, which may be waived by the issuer) to prevent the loss or
theft of the card. The merchant’s duty is left entirely up to contract with the merchant’s
bank and to association rule.
Other countries have taken a variety of approaches to the consumer’s liability for
unauthorized debit card transactions. In some, a negligence standard applies, and in
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others, a combination of rules and standards is applied. For example, in Australia, under
codes of practice adopted by the banking industry and enforced through the Australian
Banking Ombudsman, a cardholder is absolved of liability beyond Aus$50 for
unauthorized transactions occurring before notification of the issuer that a card has been
lost or stolen, provided that the cardholder was neither negligent nor contributory to the
loss of the card.255
The European Commission issued a recommendation in 1997 on the subject of
electronic payment instruments which applies to debit cards.256 The REP recommended
that member states adopt a liability ceiling for the holder in case of loss or theft of the
card for unauthorized transactions prior to the holder’s reporting the loss or theft to the
issuer, “except where he acted with extreme negligence or fraudulently.” The REP
included a recommendation that in case of a dispute, the issuer should have the burden of
proving that a transaction was accurately recorded and entered into accounts.257
However, only two member states of the EU had adopted laws following that
recommendation as of 2002.258 A proposed EC Payments Directive would establish a
ceiling of 150 euros for a consumer’s liability for unauthorized use of any payment card,
credit or debit.
In 1968 when the Truth-in-Lending Act was originally enacted in the United
States, credit cards were seen as an instrument not of access to cash, but access to
credit,259 and therefore the Act was drafted on the assumption that credit cardholders
must be treated as borrowers. A purported borrower is not ordinarily liable to repay a
loan that he or she did not authorize and from which he or she did not benefit. Something
more serious than presentation of a plastic card to the merchant is necessary to commit
the borrower to a loan, and even failure to report the loss of the card is insufficient to
ratify the unauthorized loan transaction.
Debit cards, on the other hand, confer access to cash. The liability ceiling for
unauthorized use of a debit card in EFTA was a compromise, the outcome of a battle
between advocates of a negligence standard, including the banking industry, and
consumer advocates who advocated the same $50 ceiling that applied to credit cards.260
Consumer advocates argued that the $50 ceiling was adequate incentive to consumers to
exercise sufficient care with respect to their cards, and that making the issuer liable for
losses over $50, it would have sufficient incentive to implement security measures to
minimize its losses.261 Banks, on the other hand, argued that unlike credit cards, which
have a fixed credit limit, debit card losses depended entirely on the amount of money the
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consumer had in his bank account.262 However, at that time debit cards were only usable
to access ATM’s, which have dollar limits for cash withdrawals.
Compare these rules to the rules pertaining to cash. Under American law, a
consumer has no recourse with respect to stolen cash, except to sue for conversion if he
or she can identify the perpetrator. A merchant who receives payment in lost or stolen
cash has no duty to the consumer who owns the cash, even if the circumstances of
payment were such as should have reasonably prompted suspicion. The reason for this
misallocation of loss is primarily the anonymity of cash,and secondarily the cost of time.
If cash were identified by owner – e.g., if a dollar bill had an electronic tag stating in
bright neon letters who owned it at any given moment – then would the merchant,
receiving tagged cash from the thief, still be held to no duty with respect to the identified
owner of the cash? Possibly not, but only if the legislature considered the transactions
costs in terms of time that would be incurred by the merchant in examining the bills and
asking for identification to be too significant.
For purposes deemed sufficiently important and amounts sufficiently significant,
the legislature has imposed duties on the recipient of cash. For example, money
laundering rules adopted pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act263 require banks to file
Currency Transaction Reports for cash transactions of $10,000 or more.264 Cash
transactions of $5,000 or more under suspicious circumstances require the filing of
Suspicious Activity Reports.265
American consumer law thus incorporates divergent rules and standards of loss
allocation for four instrumentalities of payment, all of which are usually used by
consumers as cash or cash equivalents.
This divergence has drawn the attention of legal scholars. In 1996, Professor
Clayton P. Gillette criticized Cooter and Rubin, supra, on the theory that an attempt to
achieve optimal efficiency could not adequately explain the choices of legislatures to
treat loss allocation rules for checks and payment cards differently. “It is curious,” he
wrote, “that the [American] law concerning fraud in payment systems varies among
payment devices.”266 He assumed that “in designing payment rules, the legislature was
seeking to allocate risks optimally,”267 but concluded that the “difficult issues of
classification” posed by regulated activities, for example, that are “susceptible to
significant variance in precautions or losses” and externalities such as politics and
historical accident can result in sub-optimal levels of precision in legislation and motivate
courts to intervene by creating exceptions or treating rules as guidelines.268 He further
pointed out that in payment systems regulation, the identification of superior risk-bearers
may be incapable of being done cost-effectively except through generalizations or the use
of surrogates.269
The Visa and MasterCard associations ultimately decided to waive the $50 in all
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cases.270 Presumably the transaction costs and loss of goodwill incurred by card issuers in
collecting the $50 from card holders who had been the victims of loss or theft proved to
be more costly than the amounts collected.
This action by Visa and MasterCard speaks eloquently to the folly of attempting
to infer in rules and standards adopted at different times under different political
conditions precise legislative judgments about optimal loss allocation. $50 was picked as
an “arbitrary figure” to establish a boundary between transactions intended by the credit
cardholder as convenience transactions and transactions intended as credit transactions,
not as an attempt to optimize anything.271 This “arbitrary figure” was established on the
theory that up to that amount the lost or stolen card would have been used as a
“convenience card” in place of cash, so that the loss should be treated as if cash had been
lost. The differences in the liability ceilings for debit and credit cards reflected a political
compromise between those who wanted to treat credit cards and debit cards the same, and
those dissatisfied with the low credit card liability ceiling who wanted to import a fault
concept into the rule.272 With credit cards increasingly being used as convenience cards
even in the United States,273 and the functional differences between debit and credit cards
correspondingly being diminished, the rationale for the small-dollar exclusion is further
weakened.
Once the consumer charges back an unauthorized debit card transaction to the
issuer, as between the issuer and the merchant, which party bears the loss? In this regard,
the loss allocation in debit card transactions is different from credit cards. Card
association rules generally allocate the loss to the issuer, on the theory that the issuer is
better situated to adopt security measures than the merchant. 274 Unlike credit card
transactions, the consumer using a PIN debit card may remain anonymous to the
merchant as long as the consumer possesses the correct PIN.
Imposing liability on the consumer for unauthorized debit card transactions in
most cases makes no sense. In general, the loss of cash is final only because cash can be
spent anonymously, not the case with cards that are used at the point of sale.275 In 1972,
in a Note in the Harvard Law Review written when credit cards were the only payment
cards in the marketplace, the author wrote:
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It is contended that bank cards are predominantly used as convenience
cards and that consumers tend to pay for their purchases as they are billed
for them rather than on an installment basis. [Footnote omitted.] But for
the purposes of furthering the two goals which were posited in section II
[reducing seller misconduct and internalizing seller misconduct costs], any
similarity between credit card purchases and cash sales is irrelevant. The
costs of seller misconduct in cash sales fall on the buyer by necessity
rather than by design. Indeed, if a convenient device were available in
cash sales to shift these costs to a third party who was in a better position
to minimize the cost of seller misconduct and to reflect the remaining
costs in the explicit price of goods, it would be desirable to do so. The
fact that such a mechanism is infeasible in actual cash sales, therefore,
does not support its exclusion in other transactions, no matter how
similar.276
In other words, the physical limitations of cash itself result in a misallocation of
the costs of merchant misconduct and encourage such misconduct. Currency and coin,
once received by a merchant, cannot be charged back to that merchant by a consumer if
the merchant is engaged in fraud or does not agree to the return of defective merchandise,
for example, while electronic payments can. It is strange yet true to regard even the
simplest face-to-face cash transaction as containing the seed of market failure.
The use of payment cards makes it feasible in most cases to correct this
misallocation through the intervention of the financial institutions that operate the
payment system. Those institutions are capable of protecting themselves through security
procedures. Since most debit cards do, or should, require use of a PIN, allocation of loss
to the consumer should be limited to cases in which the PIN is negligently or culpably
divulged by the consumer to the wrongdoer or in which the consumer’s negligent or
culpable conduct otherwise compromises a security system implemented by the issuer to
protect against unauthorized use of the card.277 If American banks want to promote
signature debit because the interchange fees are higher, they, and not the consumer or
merchant, should bear the losses that could have been prevented by the use of a PIN.
2. Inconsistency in Loss Allocation Rules
Several countries have adopted statutory rules on consumer protection of debit
and credit cardholders.278 In many respects they treat credit and debit cardholders the
same. However, there are two principal differences:
1. Rules regarding liability of the cardholder for unauthorized use of the card are
different in most countries, with debit cardholders bearing greater risk than credit
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cardholders.279
2. The claims and defenses the cardholder has based on breach of the contract by
the merchant, e.g., by supplying defective or non-conforming goods, may be asserted
against the bank that issued the card (the “issuer”) by a credit cardholder but not by a
debit cardholder.
Prepaid cardsare generally treated as equivalent to cash with respect to loss
allocation; thus, if an employee paid on a payroll card loses the card, the employee may
have no recourse, and chargeback rules applicable to credit cards do not apply. 280
However, the U.S. Federal Reserve has recently issued a proposed rulemaking thatwould
extend Regulation E coverage to certain payroll card accounts. The proposed rule would
extend to the holders of payroll cards the same disclosure and error resolution procedures
and limitations of liability for unauthorized use that currently cover the holders of debit
cards.281
Outside North America, the UK, Western Europe and the EU, Australia, Israel
and a handful of East Asian countries, laws specifically addressing consumer protection
with respect to payment cards generally do not yet exist. Thus, in China, Russia, Brazil
and other emerging economies in which debit cards are spreading rapidly the consumer’s
liability would be determined based on general standards and on rules of contract law.
In the United States, where credit cards continue to predominate over debit cards
and most consumers own both kinds of cards, these forms of discrimination against debit
cardholders in favor of credit cardholders have not, to date, been controversial, Professor
Mann’s recent article notwithstanding.282 However, in countries such as China and
Russia where relatively few people own credit cards while many millions own and use
debit cards, drawing distinctions between them adverse to debit cardholders would have a
number of disadvantages in public policy.
First, as Professor Mann has argued,283 there is not a clear rationale for
distinguishing between credit and debit cards on functional grounds. “[T]hese payment
devices serve similar functions. Checks and ATM cards are equivalents for the purpose
of gaining access to the customer’s account at the bank, and checks and credit cards are
equivalents for the purpose of incurring obligations to pay third-party providers of goods
279
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and services. Efforts to allocate the risk of loss for use of these payment devices also
would appear to share the same objectives…to allocate losses in a manner that induces
each party involved in a payment transaction to take cost-effective precautions against
loss.”284 The functions of credit and debit cards are even more similar in societies like
Japan where credit cards are used primarily for convenience rather than revolving credit,
and as convenience use increases as a proportion of total credit card charges in the United
States,285 arguments for treating American debit cardholders like users of cash rather than
like credit cardholders become weaker.
Second, issues of equity would be raised by laws or policies that discriminate
against debit cardholders in societies in which credit cards are limited to a small
economic elite capable of qualifying for them. While in the United States the differences
between consumers’ rights under TILA and EFTA can be attributed to perceived
functional differences between credit and debit cards, in countries where a few
businessmen and politicians who are able to purchase with credit cards can return shoddy
merchandise and obtain a refund while ordinary customers who use debit cards or cash
cannot, the public is likely to perceive this difference as an assertion of class privilege.
Third, because of the presumable socioeconomic differences between credit and
debit cardholders, it is likely that debit and prepaid card users in most countries will be
less sophisticated consumers than credit cardholders and therefore more in need of access
to means of recourse in cases of fraud, seller misconduct, and breach of contract. Indeed,
it could also be asserted that consumers using stored value cards should be accorded such
rights, as they are often likely to be the “unbanked” and least sophisticated among
payment card users; however, some stored value cards share with cash the problem of
anonymity and the risk of fraudulent claims.
Fourth, there may be economic justifications for disparate treatment of debit and
credit cards. On this point, Prof. Mann observes:
One obvious concern is that the extension of the reversibility rule to the
debit card context will increase the costs of debit cards to those that use
them. If so, the reform might alter the relative desirability of the products
in significant ways. From one perspective, that is not a reason for concern.
The only reason that it might alter the costs significantly is if there is a
significant volume of chargeback activity, which suggests that there are a
significant number of transactions in which consumers currently lack
effective recourse. On the other hand, as discussed above, there is the
empirical possibility that a significant level of chargebacks might reflect
abusive consumer conduct rather than dishonest merchant conduct. For the
reasons discussed above, however, I think it unlikely that there will be a
sufficiently large volume of chargebacks to affect pricing significantly,
largely because the volume of payment-reversing charge-backs in the
credit-card system now is quite small.286
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D. Behavioral Issues in Disclosure of Card Fees
Most countries that regulate payment cards impose a disclosure regime on credit
card issuers, requiring disclosure of various terms and conditions of the accounts. In the
United States, TILA and Federal Reserve Regulation Z require elaborate and lengthy
disclosures of the terms and conditions of credit card accounts to which consumers
typically pay little attention, apart from a few key terms such as the annual percentage
rate. Separate disclosures must be furnished to the cardholder in credit card applications
and solicitations, at the time of establishing the account, in the cardholder’s periodic
statements, and on an annual basis.287 Model forms for applications and solicitations
included in an appendix to Regulation Z contain key credit terms in tabular form,
followed by more voluminous detailed disclosures.288
The disclosures required for debit cards in the United States under EFTA and
Federal Reserve Regulation E289 are somewhat less voluminous,290 and model forms are
limited to the text of clauses and notices.291
Disclosure requirements as consumer protection policy must be evaluated in light
of behavioral studies suggesting that disclosure, without more, is ineffective in affecting
consumer choice.292 The 1970’s debate over simplification of Truth-in-Lending Act
requirements that resulted in the Truth-in-Lending Simplification Act of 1980 was
centered on cognitive psychology and the theory of information overload. The theory of
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information overload posits that if too much information is disclosed to consumers, they
are easily confused, are unable to use the information and do not make better decisions as
a result.293
One solution, adopted in some of the TILA model forms published by the Federal
Reserve Board, advocated by consumer groups in the U.S. and the U.K., 294 and
sometimes called the “Honesty Box” or the “Schumer Box” after Sen. Charles Schumer
(D-NY), is “layered” disclosure that highlights a few key terms, e.g., in boldface type in a
box, while more voluminous disclosures are set forth in fine print elsewhere on the
document. There is no reason why layered disclosure should be used only in certain
forms under TILA and not in debit card disclosures that are subject instead to EFTA.
If layered disclosure is to be used for debit cards, what terms should be “in the
box”? The annual percentage rate and other terms disclosed “in the box” for credit cards
are inapplicable to debit cards.
However, exorbitant and undisclosed fees for debit and prepaid card transactions
remain a problem for consumers, and affect access for consumers who typically remit
small amounts of money. In the United States, a significant percentage of prepaid cards
include per-transaction POS fees.295 Moreover, although payroll cards may be usable at
ATM’s, fees for such use are unregulated and are commonly imposed,296 apparently on
the theory that payroll cardholders are not considered bank customers because the
employer, not the cardholder, funds the account. Debit card fees may be imposed not
only by banks, but often by merchants that accept PIN-based debit cards. Consumers
who use debit cards at a point of sale in the United States often cannot be sure whether
they will be charged no fees, one fee by their bank, or two fees, one by their bank and one
by the merchant.
Moreover, the recent global proliferation of debit cards has made it easier for
consumers to overdraw their bank accounts. In some countries, such as Russia, banks
have been quick to grant small, fee-laden overdraft credit lines along with debit cards, so
that consumers who use their new debit cards to overdraw their bank accounts pay heavy
charges and interest. Elsewhere, as in China, banks have also issued secured credit cards
to their customers, and established stiff penalties and interest for overdrafts.
Fees imposed on consumers for debit card use are often arbitrary. For example,
ATM users are typically charged a fee for withdrawing cash from ATM’s in Germany but
not in France, where ATM use is free.297 An EC study in 1999 found that member state
debit card users who made purchases in other member states were charged no fee if the
card was issued in Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg or Finland, but were charged
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fees by issuing banks in other countries, with German banks charging the most.298
However, under EU Regulation 2560/2001, since July 2003 banks have been
required to charge the same for small euro cross-border payments as for domestic
payments. The effect is that, at least in theory, a French bank’s customer armed with a
French debit card could withdraw cash from a German ATM without paying a fee – if the
German ATM operator charges a fee, the French bank is supposed to bear it, not the
customer - while the same person using a German debit card would have to pay a fee for
withdrawing the same cash from the same ATM.299
In the U.S., local governmental attempts to regulate abusive ATM surcharges by
federally-chartered banks have been frustrated by federal preemption.300 The same has
been true of judicial attempts to use “Little FTC Acts” and other state laws on unfair
trade practices to strike down other bank fees, such as overdraft fees.301 A recent ruling
of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency held that the application of most state
regulatory statutes to national banks is preempted by federal law.302 In contrast, the EU
has taken an approach more favorable to substantive regulation of fees and charges, under
the authority of its Unfair Contract Terms Directive.303
Layered disclosure of debit and prepaid card fees should be required by issuers, so
that consumers will be likely to pay attention to the disclosures. Merchants that charge
fees for use of debit and prepaid cards should be required to disclose these fees in a
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meaningful fashion. Disclosure when one’s goods have already been rung up at the cash
register is not meaningful; consumers are already psychologically committed to the
transaction by that time. Rather, disclosure should be made on entry to the store, or on
approaching the cash register, and in a manner calculated to catch one’s attention.
Even layered disclosure, however, is likely to be insufficient protection for
consumers against behavioral manipulation. For example, consumers display behavioral
biases that result in the underestimation of future borrowing, and an undue optimism that
credit card balances can be paid currently, making interest rates seem unimportant.304 No
amount of disclosure is likely to curb that optimism. Moreover, the subject-matter of
disclosures lends itself to manipulation, viz. the meaninglessness of disclosure of annual
percentage rates of variable loans that are based on initial promotional rates.
Payment card fees charged by issuers are a good example of manipulable subjectmatter, because they are a morass of cross-subsidization. Late- and over-limit fees and
interest rates for credit cards are set well above marginal cost, while annual and pertransaction fees are set below marginal cost and usually, in the U.S., are non-existent.305
Bank issuers of credit cards effectively defray transaction processing costs by increased
spreads between interest rates and their cost of funds, and by imposing late- and overlimit fees. In the U.S., point-of-sale (“POS”) fees and fees for use of other banks’ ATM’s
have historically been common for PIN debit though POS fees have been cut back postWal-Mart.
In parts of Europe, however, such as Finland and Belgium, POS fees are
uncommon. Do Finnish and Belgian banks subsidize processing costs, and if so, what
charges do they impose on other services to offset this subsidy? Are banks in the U.S.
charging above marginal cost and making a profit on POS fees that goes to subsidize
credit card use, on which issuers earn high rates of interest? Most importantly, how can a
consumer know the true cost of using a payment card when certain fees subsidize other
fees? These questions require further study, but they illustrate the difficulty of
formulating disclosure requirements that will be meaningful to consumers.
E. Problems of Access to Banking Services
Debit cards, unlike prepaid cards, require a bank account. This fact places a
premium on the right to open a bank account. Banksmay turn away customers they
deem undesirable due to adverse credit history, immigration status or other reasons. It
appears to be uncommon in the United States for customers to be denied the right to open
a bank account, but not so in Europe. During 2004, Belgium enacted legislation
guaranteeing all consumers the right to access to bank services. Other EU countries have
enacted or considered enacting similar legislation.
Outside Western Europe and Scandinavia, however, laws of this kind are virtually
non-existent. Although American law prohibits discrimination on the basis of certain
invidious categories such as race and gender, there is no general right to a bank account
in the United States, and nothing prevents banks from turning away customers who want
to open a deposit account on grounds related to poverty, for example, that they have a
past bankruptcy or foreclosure on their credit record, or have been evicted from their
304
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residence, or lack a permanent address.
In several countries, lack of physical access to banking services has been a
prominent consumer issue, particularly the lack of branch banks in rural areas. In
addition to promising technological solutions like m-banking, one creative attempt to
provide geographic access is Banco Postal in Brazil, a joint venture between a major
bank, Bradesco, and the Brazilian Postal and Telegraph Co. (Correios) to place branches
in post offices in areas that previously lacked financial services.306 The post office banks
have brought over 1.5 million previously “unbanked” people in Brazil into the banking
system.
As discussed above, password-protected prepaid cards are another solution to the
problem of the “unbanked.” Stored value cards present money- laundering issues that are
beyond the scope of this article but might limit the enthusiasm of law enforcement
authorities for them as a solution. As the amount of value stored on cards grows, they
also could pose economic issues regarding regulation of the money supply. The trend in
the developed economies is toward stored value cards, particularly phone cards, being
used for mobilemicro payments to vendors of goods and services apart from their use to
pay for telephone calls.307 Stored value cards also are usable at ATM’s to obtain cash.
However, in emerging economies such as Russia, and to some extent in the U.S.,
stored value payroll cards, such as those now offered by Visa U.S.A., are becoming
common. If one’s entire salary is paid by loading value onto a stored value card, it is
likely that one will use the card for more than just micropayments or ATM transactions.
As payroll cards solve problems of access to banking services, and as merchants
in the developing world acquire the necessary equipment to accept them in payment, the
number of large-amount stored value card payment transactions can be expected to
increase significantly. Also, with so much value stored on cards, problems of security
and the risk of unauthorized transactions are magnified. Though payroll cards are usually
password-protected, such protection has not always prevented fraudulent transactions,
e.g., in Canada where sophisticated schemes have resulted in a high rate of theft and
misuse of passwords for PIN debit cards.
F. Discharge of Obligations in Debit and Prepaid Card Transactions:
the Insolvency Problem
Because most debit and prepaid card transactions, other than signature debit, clear
in real time, discharge of obligations in debit and prepaid card consumer transactions is
usually not an issue, except in the case of “signature” debit transactions where there is a
delay before the merchant receives payment. Misdirected payments are not usually a
problem because magnetic strip and chip technology on cards and the technology of cardreading equipment have made them unusual. In contrast, UCC Article 4A, applicable to
wire transfers through commercial wire transfer systems such as the Federal Reserve’s
FedWire system, devotes several sections to problems of discharge and misdirected
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payments;308 wire transfers are more susceptible to error due to manual entry of payment
instructions such as the beneficiary/payee’s account number.
Discharge rules can become an issue in case of insolvency, either the insolvency
of financial institutions, payment service companies such as PayPal that maintain
consumer accounts, or transaction processors such as First Data Corp. that process card
transactions on behalf of financial institutions. Discharge also can be problematic in case
of the insolvency of the payor or the merchant.
Financial institution insolvency continues to be a problem for consumers in Africa
and elsewhere in the developing world. In the mid-1990’s nine banks in Zambia,
representing over 23% of total commercial bank assets, failed.309 At roughly the same
time Nigeria witnessed the failure of seventeen local banks, while Kenya and Uganda
also experienced the failure of several local banks that represented significant
percentages of commercial bank assets in those countries.310 A large number of these
banks, particularly in Kenya and Nigeria, failed due to defaulted insider loans made to
politicians to whom credit had apparently been extended in exchange for arranging to
have the funds of governmental or parastatal organizations deposited in the bank.311
Bank failure was not confined to Africa; for example, another six banks failed in Turkey
at about the same time.
As mobile telephone service providers and other intermediaries enter the market
for payment services, insolvency of payment service providers and money remitters has
become a consumer issue in the developed world as well. Numerous payment services
have been dissolved or initiated bankruptcy cases in the United States, and the legal
system has had to address issues regarding the entitlement of consumers and payees to
funds deposited with the payment service. If mobile telephone service providers become
major providers of payment services, the same issues may have to be addressed with
respect to telephone service providers that become insolvent.
One solution is to extend governmental deposit insurance programs to cover funds
deposited to add value to prepaid cards. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation in the U.S. recently initiated a proposed rulemaking to extend deposit
insurance to bank accounts established by employers to pay workers who are issued
payroll cards linked to those accounts.312
VI.

Conclusions

The lack of a global focus of scholarship in payment systems law has flawed that
scholarship. Americans’ use of payment cards has been treated as mainstream. It is not.
America’s addiction to credit cards is an anomaly – perhaps one that is gradually
disappearing, but an anomaly nonetheless.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this article:
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1. Debit and prepaid cards are proliferating in countries that lack an adequate
regulatory regime for protecting the consumers who use them.
2. The billions of people of low to moderate incomes who are being hurled from a
cash economy into the era of electronic payments in emerging economies by the
proliferation of debit and prepaid cards are particularly vulnerable to abuses by banks and
merchants.
3. Unregulated private lawmaking by payment card associations and card issuers
will not ensure that consumers are treated fairly, due to their countervailing incentives to
attract merchants into payment networks.
4. Technological solutions promote efficiency and limit abuse, but cannot ensure
fair resolution of consumer disputes.
5. Nations with emerging economies should not uncritically emulate regimes of
consumer protection adopted in the United States and Europe, which in many respects
lack a consistentconceptual foundation and fail to address problems, such as bank fees,
access to banking services and insolvency, that are poorly addressed in developed
countries if they are addressed at all.
6. Debit and prepaid card transactions are both a convenient means of obtaining
cash and a substitute for cash, but this does not justify treating consumers who use debit
and prepaid cards as if they had paid in cash.
7. The lack of anonymity inherent in the use of payment cards entails risk for
consumer privacy, but also makes possible greater transparency and disclosure to
consumers of outcomes of the chargeback system such as merchant ratings.
8. Fees and charges imposed on consumers for payment card services are one of
the most prolific sources of consumer complaints. Fee regulation should be regarded as a
legitimate part of payments law in scholarship on the subject, and should not be ignored
in establishing a regulatory system to govern debit and prepaid cards.
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